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Abstract
Environmental goods such as clean air and water are integral to human quality
of life. However, because these amenities are not priced, their monetary values
are not directly apparent. As a result, Hedonic methods have been employed as a
tool to recover household Marginal Willingness To Pay (MWTP) for these goods
to inform policy-making given constrained public resources. This thesis consists of
three chapters tied to the Hedonic valuation of a particular environmental ‘bad,’
proximity to a brownfield site. Brownfield properties are lands that cannot be used
due to the presence of a low-risk, hazardous substance.
The first chapter (joint work with Kevin Haninger and Christopher Timmins)
uses property value hedonics to reveal household willingness to pay for brownfield
cleanup . We exploit variation in space and time to deal with the potential bias
in estimating MWTP due to unobservable variables that are correlated with both
housing prices and site cleanup. Furthermore, there has been recent work showing
that if equilibrium price functions change over time, the capitalization of changes
in neighborhood amenities into property values over time (e.g. brownfield cleanup)
may neither represent the preferences of those living in the neighborhood before
changes occurred or after Kuminoff and Pope (2011). To address this, we provide a
way to estimate cleanup without assuming that the hedonic price function is stable
over time, an assumption that would likely be violated if site cleanup brought about
significant changes to the community populations around the sites.
iv
The second chapter considers two sources of distortions in the valuation of non-
marketed goods - an expectations bias and a learning bias. If consumers suspect
that cleanup of a brownfield is likely before it is cleaned (expectation) or gain new
information about the severity of the brownfield contamination (information), then
baseline period prices need to be adjusted to account for these potential distortions
to the MWTP estimate. To address this, I collect a new data set on brownfield
contamination information over time from Massachusetts, and recover hedonic values
from a dynamic neighborhood choice framework that allows agents to learn about
brownfield hazards in a Bayesian fashion. I find a MWTP estimate of $888.38 per unit
of site contamination when accounting for learning and forward-looking behavior,
which is more than double the simple hedonic estimate. Furthermore, parameters
from my model can be used to calculate the average value of information provided
by a site assessment.
The final chapter, joint work with Gabrielle Inder, examines whether different
types of information about brownfield contamination capitalize into property values
differently. More specifically, we estimate a property value hedonic model to test if
housing prices are impacted differently if information about nearby contamination is
released as a continuous measure as opposed to a binary measure (i.e. exceeding a
threshold value or not). We do this by exploiting variation in contaminant thresh-
olds used, holding constant the contaminant level, due to regulatory requirements for
brownfield investigations in the State of Massachusetts. As the variation in threshold
levels are tied to the level of human exposure of the areas in which these contam-
inated sites exist, threshold exceedance is potentially correlated with unobserved
neighborhood characteristics that also impact housing values, creating the potential
for biased parameter estimates. To deal with this, we take an instrumental variables
approach using variation in threshold exceedance due to the location of underground
water sources. After instrumenting for threshold exceedance with the presence of an
v
underground aquifer, our estimates indicate a 10.8% decrease in housing values from
exceeding contaminant thresholds conditioning on contaminant levels, while contin-
uous toxicity levels have a negative but insignificant effect. These findings suggest
that polices aimed to improve public awareness about pollution should be cognizant
of how information is conveyed, as it may allow for better design of information
provision programs aimed to improve environmental quality.
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1Estimating the Impacts of Brownfield Remediation
on Housing Property Values
with Kevin Haninger1 and Christopher Timmins2
1.1 Introduction
Land revitalization is a beneficial, yet costly, process to undertake. Lands are often
contaminated with various harmful substances that require expensive procedures to
treat. In some instances, toxic waste sites are shown to pose a direct threat to human
health. In other cases, sites may pose a low risk to nearby residents, but are left
unused (or under-used) until even small amounts of contaminants are removed. Most
would agree upon the importance of treating (or at least containing) health hazards
at high-risk sites. As for low-risk sites, however, it is far less obvious that the benefits
of remediation should exceed the costs. Even though these sites may not be especially
toxic, their oftentimes poor aesthetic quality combined with their additional need for
special treatment in order to be re-developed causes the surrounding area to be an
undesirable place to live or work. Thus, the benefits of revitalizing these sites include
1Haninger: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
2Timmins: Duke University Department of Economics and NBER
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the economic development that would result from making them more productive and
attractive. The EPA has designated these lower-risk sites as brownfields and has
aimed to promote their revitalization through grant funding.
1.1.1 Identifying the Effects of Brownfield Remediation
This paper uses a slate of quasi-experimental approaches to estimate the benefits of
brownfield cleanup by examining its effect on nearby property values. In this respect,
the paper draws upon the extensive literature on property-value hedonics to recover
homeowner willingness-to-pay for remediation.3 The value of cleanup, as captured by
the value capitalized into nearby housing prices, is a good way to measure a variety
of beneficial effects, including effects on numerous local neighborhood amenities.
Under certain conditions that we describe below, these capitalization effects can
be given a welfare interpretation, making them particularly useful for cost-benefit
analysis. In an ideal research environment, one would randomly select brownfield
sites for cleanup and observe the impacts of that cleanup on nearby housing prices.
The random selection of sites into the remediation process would guarantee that
unobservable determinants of changes in local housing prices would not be correlated
with changes induced by remediation, allowing the researcher to cleanly identify the
latter. While more common in some areas of research, opportunities for these sorts
of experiments are not often available in environmental economics.4 Indeed, it is the
case that the Brownfields Program awards cleanup grants based on a competitive
process. The outcome of this process may lead to the award of cleanup funds to
locations that differ systematically from locations that do not receive funds. To the
extent that we can control for these differences with observables, they do not present
a problem. Data describing sites and the neighborhoods around them are limited,
3See Taylor (2003) and Palmquist (2005) for summaries of this literature
4See Banerjee and Duflo (2009) for a description of the extensive role played by randomized
experiments in development economics.
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however, so there are necessarily going to be variables that we cannot control for
directly.
We therefore adopt a variety of quasi-experimental approaches to identifying
the effect of cleanup on brownfields. The idea of these approaches is to exploit
some source of exogenous variation in data that approximates that which would
result from a truly random experiment. We begin by demonstrating the bias that
could result from ignoring unobservable confounders altogether with a cross-sectional
specification. In particular, we compare locations with an untreated brownfield to
areas with a remediated brownfield. The problem is that these groups may differ
systematically with respect to unobservables that could be correlated with treatment
status.
We then demonstrate how even a simple fixed effects specification, which uses
changes in a neighborhood’s exposure to an unremediated brownfield site, can help
solve the problem. In particular, if unobservable differences between houses in the
different neighborhoods are constant over time, we can difference that heterogeneity
away by looking at changes in exposure status accompanying cleanup activities. Of
course, only houses surrounding sites that are remediated experience a change in
exposure status, so we must limit our analysis to houses in these neighborhoods.
The problem with the fixed effects specification is that not all unobserved factors
will be time-invariant. If brownfield cleanup funds are typically awarded to ‘up-
and-coming’ neighborhoods, the effect of cleanup will be confounded by those other
improvements. The opposite would be true if awards were made in an attempt to
turn around declining neighborhoods. Fixed effects are unable to deal with these
time-varying unobservable factors that are correlated with cleanup activity. This is
where we move to techniques traditionally considered ‘quasi-experimental.’
First, we consider the ‘difference-in-differences’ (DID) specification. This ap-
proach defines a treatment group (e.g., the houses immediately surrounding a brown-
3
field that is treated at some point in time t∗) and a control group (e.g., houses nearby
to those in the treatment group, so that we can safely assume that other time-varying
neighborhood factors will be the same, but far enough away so as to be able to assume
that the impact of the brownfield site is negligible).5 DID then compares the change
in prices in the treatment group from houses sold in t > t∗ to those sold in t < t∗ to
a similarly defined change in the control group. The change in prices in the control
group, intuitively, controls for any changes in price induced by neighborhood-specific
factors aside from brownfield remediation. The remaining effect can therefore be
ascribed to the cleanup. Note in addition that, in the process of differencing within
the treatment or the control groups, any time-invariant differences between these
groups are controlled for as well.
The DID approach to estimation requires a number of non-trivial assumptions.
The most important is the ‘common trends’ assumption - in particular, that the
change over time in log price in the treatment and control groups would be the
same (conditional upon observable covariates) were the treatment group to have
remained untreated. This assumption is not testable. In addition to the common
trends assumption, the DID specification requires that the equilibrium hedonic price
function remain stable over time in order to give estimates a welfare interpretation.
The same is also true of the fixed effects specification. We describe this issue in more
detail in the following subsection, and use a DID matching estimator that avoids
using time variation to deal with it.
1.1.2 Capitalization v. Marginal Willingness to Pay
The fixed effect and DID approaches to recovering the benefits of site remediation
suffer from a similar problem. In particular, each requires an assumption that the
hedonic price function, which describes the equilibrium relationship between house
5In practice, ‘treatment’ will consist of several stages, including assessment and cleanup activi-
ties, that we will model explicitly.
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attributes (including exposure and treatment status) and price, is stable over time.
Given the substantial neighborhood turnover that may occur in response to brown-
field redevelopment, this assumption may be questionable. Put differently, with a
new local population, the willingness-to-pay for not being exposed to an untreated
brownfield site that is revealed by the hedonic price function may be very different
after cleanup. Kuminoff and Pope (2011) show that the results of simple fixed ef-
fect estimation of the price response to cleanup may therefore fail to identify the
MWTP of either those living in proximity to the brownfield before or after cleanup.
Instead, it will recover a ‘capitalization’ effect (i.e., the simple response of price to
a cleanup, without any additional welfare interpretations). The capitalization effect
of a cleanup may be interesting in its own right (e.g., considering implications for
property tax revenue collection), but it does not imply a welfare interpretation.
To overcome this problem, we suggest an alternative to using time variation under
the traditional Diff-in-Diff estimator. In particular, we use a DID nearest-neighbor
matching estimator (DD-NNM) that exploits the differences between both treatment
and control groups within a neighborhood surrounding a particular site, and the
differences between cleaned and uncleaned sites. This method compares similar
houses in treatment and control groups around sites that were and were not cleaned,
but does not require any comparisons over time. Matching of similar sites relies,
in particular, on the state the brownfield is in, the number of previous assessments
performed, the type of grant proposal (petroleum or hazardous substances), and
Brownfield Program grant scores, which provide a good source of exogenous variation
in cleanup status for otherwise similar sites.6 By ‘double differencing’ in this manner
(instead of over time), we are able to cleanly identify a different hedonic price function
6Applications receiving higher scores are more likely to be funded, but in any particular year a
given score may or may not be funded owing to variability in the program’s budget - simply put,
the program works its way down the list of ranked proposals allocating funds until the budget runs
out.
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in each year. By not relying on time variation and an assumption of a stationary
hedonic gradient, we are able to interpret our estimates as willingnesses to pay instead
of simply capitalization effects.
Together, our fixed effect and quasi-experimental approaches to estimation all
lead to a common conclusion - that cleanups conducted under the Brownfield Pro-
gram yield a large, statistically significant, positive, but highly-localized effect on
housing prices.
1.1.3 A Note on Localized Externalities
Brownfields, like many other disamenities (Superfund sites, TSDF’s, TRI plants)
may have very localized impacts on house prices. As such, it can prove difficult to
recover these impacts without access to high-resolution data. Cleanup of a brown-
field, for example, may not be perceptible in information about census tract median
housing prices, while it may in fact have large impacts on nearby houses. One so-
lution to this problem is to use high-resolution decennial census block-level data
(Gamper-Rabindran et al. (2011)). That approach, however, introduces two poten-
tial problems. First, low-frequency decennial data may confound brownfield cleanup
with other unobserved events that occurred at some other time during the same
decade. Unlike Superfund remediation, brownfield cleanups can be relatively quick,
leaving a great deal of remaining time over a ten-year period for other things to
happen. Second, cleanups under the Brownfield Program have all taken place in the
last decade, and long-form decennial census data have not been collected since 2000.
These data are now collected as part of the American Community Survey, and are
available at high geographic resolution only on a ‘moving average’ basis (e.g., for the
period 2005-2009). Given that brownfield cleanup can be initiated and completed
relatively quickly, we would not know whether most of the cleanups in our data set
occurred before or after the homeowner valuations stated in the 2005-2009 ACS data.
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In light of all of these concerns, we employ housing transactions data from
Dataquick, Inc. that are both high-resolution (i.e., latitude and longitude) and
high-frequency (i.e., day of transaction). This allows us to measure the impact of
the cleanup with a great deal of precision, both in space and time.
1.1.4 Limitations of the Analysis
Before proceeding, we acknowledge a few limitations of our analysis. First, looking at
the price of housing in close proximity to brownfield sites will not capture equilibrium
effects that are realized elsewhere in the urban area - i.e., cleanup of brownfields may
have impacts on local labor markets and on particular housing markets far from the
brownfield in question. We will fail to capture these effects to the extent that they
appear in other parts of the city. Given the size of a typical brownfield (relative
to the size of an urban area), this may not be much of a practical issue. Still, we
do note that new methods (i.e., estimable sorting models) may be able to deal with
these sorts of concerns. (Kuminoff et al. (2013))
Second, our approach will also not capture health benefits from remediation that
people are not aware of (and, hence, are not reflected in house purchase decisions
and transactions prices). In contrast to other nuisances (Superfund sites, TSDF’s,
or other toxic waste exposure), we do not expect this to be as much of an issue for
brownfield sites, making property value hedonics a good approach in this context.
1.1.5 Outline
This paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 describes the EPA Brownfields
Program and cleanup process, paying particular attention to the cleanup grant ap-
plication and scoring process. Section 3 describes our methodological approach,
detailing the different specifications we use to recover estimates of MWTP in the
presence of correlated unobservables. Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5
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reports estimates from each specification. Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion
and ‘back-of-the-envelope’ cost-benefit analysis.
1.2 The EPA Brownfields Program
A brownfield is a ‘real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which
may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant.’7 Typically, brownfields are lands that were previously
used for industrial or commercial purposes and include areas that are contaminated
by low concentrations of hazardous substances. These sites are diverse in nature and
can range from being old dry cleaning establishments and gas stations to processing
plants for materials such as steel, bricks, and asbestos. Generally, brownfields pose
lower risk to human health than other types of hazardous waste sites, as they exclude
sites listed or proposed for listing on the National Priorities List and sites that are
remediated under the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office estimates that there are more than 450,000 brownfields nation-
wide. In 1995, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency initiated the Brownfields
Program to assist public and private sector organizations in revitalizing brownfields,
mainly by providing grant funding. The aim was not only to improve the environ-
ment, but also to promote social and economic reinvestment in these unused lands.
In 2002, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (i.e.,
the ‘Brownfields Law’) was signed as an amendment to the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), which
established the Superfund program. The passage of the Brownfields Law formalized
EPA policies regarding brownfields and expanded financial and technical assistance
for brownfield remediation through the Brownfields Program.
7http://epa.gov/brownfields/. See the EPA’s website for further details on the Brownfields Pro-
gram and a link to public law 107-118 (H.R. 2869), ‘Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act’.
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1.2.1 Brownfield Grants
Brownfields grants serve as the foundation of the Brownfields Program and support
land revitalization efforts by funding environmental site assessment, cleanup, and
job training activities. There are four types of competitive grants that serve spe-
cific purposes in the land revitalization process. Assessment grants provide up to
$200,000 for a grant recipient to inventory, characterize, assess, and conduct plan-
ning and community involvement related to brownfields sites. Job training grants
provide funding to recruit mostly unemployed, low-income and minority residents
from brownfield-affected areas and to train these individuals to secure full-time jobs
in site assessment and cleanup. Cleanup grants provide up to $200,000 to perform
cleanup activities at a brownfield site contaminated by petroleum and hazardous
substances. Finally, revolving loan fund grants provide funding to capitalize a re-
volving loan fund, which is used to make loans and sub-grants for cleanup activities
at brownfield sites. Since passage of the Brownfields Law through FY 2011, EPA has
competitively awarded 1,479 assessment grants totaling $331.3 million, 143 revolving
loan fund grants totaling $167.5 million, 801 cleanup grants totaling $150.7 million,
and 121 job training grants totaling $25.2 million.
1.2.2 Cleanup Grant Applications, Proposal Scoring, and Awards
This paper focuses on the effect of cleanup grants on housing values. As stated above,
cleanup grants provide up to $200,000 to perform cleanup activities at a brownfield
site contaminated by petroleum or hazardous substances. Due to budgetary limita-
tions, no eligible entity may apply for funding cleanup activities at more than three
sites. Cleanup grants require a 20 percent cost share in the form of a contribution of
money, labor, material, or services for eligible and allowable costs; however, appli-
cants may request a waiver of the cost share requirement based on financial hardship.
The performance period for cleanup grants is three years. Cleanup grant proposals
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are evaluated against both threshold and ranking criteria. Applicants must pass all
threshold criteria in order to quality for funding. Threshold criteria include site own-
ership and eligibility for federal brownfield assistance, community notification and
opportunity for public comment prior to proposal submission, and a letter from the
appropriate state or tribal environmental authority acknowledging that the applicant
plans to apply for federal brownfield assistance.
Conditional upon passing all threshold criteria, the proposal will receive a numer-
ical score from the evaluation panel. Scores are based on several evaluation fields, in-
cluding community need, project description and feasibility, community involvement
and partnerships, and reduction of threats to human health and the environment.
Once scored, cleanup grant proposals are ranked from highest to lowest score and
then awarded funding in rank order until the program budget has been exhausted.8
If a proposal is not awarded in one year, the applicant can reapply in a subse-
quent year. Within the universe of brownfield cleanup proposals, we identified 172
properties that reapplied for funding at least once in the six-year period after the
program began, 87 of which was eventually awarded funding. This implies that the
brownfield site could be associated with different proposal scores and different award
statuses. We take the applicant’s most recent score and application outcome, assum-
ing that it represents the applicant’s best and most knowledgeable proposal effort.
More details on how scores are compared across grant years are provided in Section
4.
1.3 Model and Identification
Since brownfield cleanup activity is not directly traded in markets, a revealed pref-
erence approach is used to infer its value from its impact on nearby housing prices.
8More information on the cleanup grant application process can be found at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/applicat.htm.
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This paper uses the hedonic method to model a property’s price.9 For a thorough
discussion of the hedonic method, see the reviews by Taylor (2003) and Palmquist
(2005). The hedonic price function is defined as a mapping from the attributes of
a house, including the presence of a nearby brownfield, to a price in equilibrium.
The implicit price of brownfield exposure may be measured with, for example, the
hedonic price gradient with respect to distance.
The hedonic method is based on the idea that homeowners’ disutility from living
in close proximity to a brownfield site can be measured by observing compensating
price differentials in housing markets. In general, the homeowner’s marginal willing-
ness to pay (MWTP) for some desirable attribute (e.g., distance from a brownfield
site) can be read off of the hedonic gradient (i.e., the derivative of the hedonic
price function), owing to utility-maximizing homeowners’ sorting behavior. Rosen’s
seminal paper (Rosen (1974)) and the literature it sparked describe procedures for
recovering the MWTP functions for heterogeneous individuals. Bishop and Timmins
(2011) describe many of the difficulties encountered in this exercise - because of these
difficulties, the typical approach in the applied hedonics literature has been to ig-
nore this heterogeneity and either recover a function that describes price as a linear
function of distance, or one that treats exposure discretely, defining it according to
whether a house falls inside a particular distance band drawn around a brownfield.
That is the approach we adopt here.
One of the more difficult problems that arises when implementing the hedonic
method is the presence of house and neighborhood attributes that are unobserved
by the researcher but correlated with the attribute of interest. These unobservables
have the potential to bias the results of a simple cross-sectional specification. Em-
9Assuming that the housing supply is fixed in the short-run, any improvement to a brownfield is
assumed to be completely capitalized into price and not in the quantity of housing supplied. Given
that the Brownfields Program is relatively recent, we would expect to still be in the ‘short-run’. As
more time passes, researchers will be able to study whether cleanups have had a discernible impact
on new development.
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pirical approaches that are used to deal with this problem include (i) fixed effects,
(ii) differences-in-differences, and (iii) matching estimators. We briefly review the
econometric theory behind each of these modeling strategies below.
1.3.1 Cross-Sectional Estimates
The simplest specification ignores any panel variation in the data. Considering all
houses in counties that contain brownfields10, the most straightforward comparison
is to compare houses in the vicinity of a brownfield site to ones in the county that
are not exposed to a site at all. Exposure is defined geographically; houses located
inside a circular buffer of 5km surrounding a site are considered to be ‘exposed’.
However, houses and neighborhoods near brownfields are likely to be different in
unobservable ways from those that are not, and these unobservables may lead to
biased estimates. Table 1.1 describes the observable attributes of houses surrounding
brownfields in our sample compared with those not exposed to brownfields in the rest
of the county, regardless of cleanup status (but before any cleanup has occurred at
sites that are cleaned). A simple inspection of this table suggests several reasons
to be concerned about the results of a simple cross-sectional analysis. In particular,
there are statistically and economically significant differences between houses that lie
in close proximity (5km) to a brownfield and those that do not - e.g., houses within
5km of a brownfield site are less expensive and tend to be older and smaller than
those in the rest of the county. These large differences in observables suggest that
there may also be differences in unobservable attributes of each of these groups of
sites.
An alternative approach limits the analysis to only houses surrounding brown-
fields within 5km of sites (both those that have and those that have not been cleaned).
By limiting the sample in this way, we narrow the variation in unobservable hetero-
10We describe the sample of brownfield sites we use for estimation in Section 4.
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geneity that might be correlated with brownfield exposure. We estimate the following
regression specification:
Pi = β0 + β1CLEANUPi +X
′
iδ + Y EAR
′
iγ + i (1.1)
where
Pi = log of transaction price of house i
CLEANUPi = 1 if brownfield that house i is exposed to has been treated
under the Brownfields Program11
Xi = vector of attributes of house i
Y EARi = vector of dummy variables indicating year in which house i is sold
The effect of cleanup is then measured by β1. The problem here is that CLEANUPi
is still likely to be correlated with i. Potential bias arises if brownfields that re-
ceived treatment were systematically different in unobservable ways from those that
did not receive treatment. We might, for example, expect that houses located in
close proximity to awarded brownfields may be of lower quality than those located
near non-awarded sites. Table 1.2 compares houses surrounding cleaned brownfields
from our sample to those surrounding brownfields that have not been cleaned. While
Table 1.2 shows that the size of those differences is dramatically lower than are the
differences between areas with and without brownfield sites, evidence of significant
differences between houses lying inside a 5km buffer of sites that are eventually
cleaned compared with those that are not eventually cleaned still exist. For subse-
quent methods, we limit the analysis to only using houses within 5km of brownfield
sites.
11In practice, this will be houses exposed to awarded brownfields after the brownfield has un-
dergone cleanup.
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1.3.2 Fixed Effects
The simplest approach to dealing with unobserved house and neighborhood at-
tributes that may be correlated with brownfield remediation is to exploit the varia-
tion in panel data to control for time-invariant neighborhood attributes. Suppose Pitk
measures the natural log of the price of house i located in the neighborhood around
brownfield k which transacts in year t. Xitk is a vector of attributes of that house,
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and CLEANUPitk is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the brownfield k
has completed the cleanup process by period t (= 0 otherwise).13 As in equation
1.1, consider only houses that are in close proximity to brownfields.14 µk is a time-
invariant attribute associated with the neighborhood around brownfield site k that
may or may not be observable by the researcher, and νitk is a time-varying unobserv-
able attribute associated with the house. Importantly, µk may be correlated with
CLEANUPitk (i.e., sites that receive cleanup treatment may be in neighborhoods
that are systematically different from those that do not receive cleanup).
Pitk = β0 + β1CLEANUPitk +X
′
itkδ + µk + νitk (1.2)
12Note that, with Dataquick data, house attributes do not vary over time because only the
structural attributes from the most recent property assessment is recorded. We subscript X by k
and t simply to indicate the neighborhood in which the house is found and the year in which it
transacts.
13Housing transactions observed before the start of the cleanup period are given a value of
CLEANUPitk = 0. In practice, we distinguish between houses sold before and during cleanup
from those sold after. We discuss this in detail in Section 4.
14We present estimates from using multiple buffers to demonstrate robustness.
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Using (i, k) ∈ k to denote all houses in all years that lie in the neighborhood sur-
rounding site k, we can take the within-neighborhood means of each variable:
Pk =
1
Nk
∑
(i,k)∈k
Pitk (1.3)
CLEANUPk =
1
Nk
∑
(i,k)∈k
CLEANUPitk
Xk =
1
Nk
∑
(i,k)∈k
Xitk
µk =
1
Nk
∑
(i,k)∈k
µitk
νk =
1
Nk
∑
(i,k)∈k
νitk
and generate mean-differenced data:
P˜k = Pitk − Pk (1.4)
˜CLEANUP k = CLEANUPitk − CLEANUPk
X˜k = Xitk −Xk
µ˜k = µitk − µk
ν˜k = νitk − νk
Noting that µitk − µk = 0, we can then re-write equation 1.2:
P˜itk = β1 ˜CLEANUP itk + X˜
′
itkδ + ν˜itk (1.5)
Estimating this specification therefore controls for any permanent unobservable dif-
ferences between places that received cleanup treatment and those that did not.
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1.3.3 Difference-in-Differences (DID)
Let Pitk be the log of the price of house i in the neighborhood surrounding brownfield
site k at time t. At some point in time, site k is cleaned. Considering only houses
in the vicinity of brownfields that are cleaned (5km), and let the treatment group of
houses be defined by those that are close enough (i.e. closer than 5km) to be affected
by that cleanup. A specific definition of treatment is discussed in section 3.4, but
the intuition is that these houses are particularly close to the brownfield, while there
may be other houses in the same local neighborhood that experience the same local
public goods but are far enough from the brownfield to not be ‘treated’ by it. We
define this distance below.
The dummy variable TREATik is equal to 1 if house i belongs to the treatment
group (i.e., is located within some buffer b, less than 5km, surrounding the brown-
field), and it is equal to 0 if it belongs to the control group (i.e., inside 5km but
outside the treatment group). Let POSTtk indicate post-treatment, which equals 1
if a house lying within 5km of site k (in either the treatment or control group) sells
after site k is cleaned. The model for the observed log price is then written as
Pitk = β0 + β1TREATik + β2POSTitk + piTREATik × POSTitk + uitk (1.6)
where pi represents the expected change in log price for the treated group less the
expected change in price for the control group. According to the above model, it is
equal to
pi =
(
E [Pitk | TREATik = 1, POSTitk = 1] (1.7)
− E [Pitk | TREATik = 1, POSTitk = 0]
)
−
(
E [Pitk | TREATik = 0, POSTitk = 1]
− E [Pitk | TREATik = 0, POSTitk = 0]
)
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Using the ‘potential outcomes’ notation (Rubin 1974), where P 0itk represents the log
of i’s potential price if the house does not receive treatment and P 1itk represents the
log of i’s potential price if it does.
pi =
(
E
[
P 1i1k | TREATik = 1
]− E [P 0i0k | TREATik = 1] ) (1.8)
−
(
E
[
P 0i1k | TREATik = 0
]− E [P 00 | TREATik = 0] )
The main identifying assumption underlying the DID model is that of common
trends, which specifies that
E
[
P 0i1k | TREATik = 1
]− E [P 0i0k | TREATik = 1] (1.9)
= E
[
P 0i1k | TREATik = 0
]− E [P 0i0k | TREATik = 0]
In the case of brownfields, this assumption implies that, in the absence of cleanup,
the potential log prices of properties in the treated group would have followed the
same trend as log prices in the control group. Under this assumption, pi identifies the
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). In particular, we can use equation
1.9 to replace the third and fourth terms in equation 1.8:
pi =
(
E
[
P 1i1k | TREATik = 1
]− E [P 0i0k | TREATik = 1] ) (1.10)
−
(
E
[
P 0i1k | TREATik = 0
]− E [P 0i0k | TREATik = 0] )︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[P 0i1k|TREATik=1]−E[P 0i0k|TREATik=1]
Canceling repeated terms yields
pi = E
[
P 1i1k | TREATik = 1
]− E [P 0i1k | TREATik = 1] (1.11)
Failing to control for observable covariates may invalidate the common trends as-
sumption. One can easily control for them by extending the regression model used
to recover pi:
Pitk = β0 + β1TREATik + β2POSTitk + piTREATik ×POSTitk +X ′ikδ+ uitk (1.12)
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In practice this regression model can be expanded to include multiple groups and
multiple treatment periods. For application to brownfield cleanup, we separate the
pre-cleanup time frame into two periods and make all comparisons to prices before
cleanup activities begin. This will be elaborated in Section 4.1.
1.3.4 Defining Treatment and Control Groups
The DID specification allows one to control for two types of unobservables. First,
it controls for unobservables that vary by group (treatment and control) but not
over time. Second, it controls for unobservables that affect outcomes over time but
are common to both groups. This motivates the definition of treatment and control
groups to identify cleanup impact. One way is to define the treatment group as the
properties near a brownfield that is cleaned and the control group as those near a
brownfield that remains uncleaned. However, if the two brownfields are located in
different places, it is likely that the prices of surrounding houses will be subject to
unobservables that are not only group-specific, but which also change over time. An
example would be if brownfields that are cleaned are in up-and-coming neighbor-
hoods compared to those that are not. Over time, the prices of houses near cleaned
brownfields would reflect this improvement, compromising the DID identification
strategy.
Instead of defining treatment and control groups as above, this paper follows
the strategy employed by Linden and Rockoff (2008), using adjacent neighborhoods
around a brownfield to define treatment and control groups to alleviate the problem
of group- and time-specific unobservables.15 That is, houses located within a certain
distance of a brownfield are considered to be in the treatment group, while houses
located outside of that distance (where the site has no effect regardless of cleanup) are
designated as controls. To find that distance, we estimate two functions describing
15Linden and Rockoff (2008) estimate the impact of sex offender arrival in Mecklenberg County,
North Carolina.
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the relationship between price and the distance to the nearest brownfield for all
property transactions occurring before and after cleanup. Ideally, the distance at
which the difference in the price functions becomes insignificant is the point at which
we would define the cutoff between the treatment and control groups.
Specifically, one would expect that prices of properties closer to brownfield sites
are impacted more by cleanup than those located far away. Furthermore, at some
distance far enough away from the site, cleanup should not influence property prices
at all. It has been found that the effects of hazardous waste sites such as those on
the National Priorities List decrease very quickly with distance from the site (Adler
et al. (1982), Kohlhase (1991), Kiel (1995)). This suggests that the treatment and
control groups can be defined by the distance at which brownfields begin to have no
impact. If this were the case, then price shocks that would affect the trend of one
group would arguably affect that of the other group as well. Ultimately, the common
trend assumption is untestable. However, this paper provides graphical evidence in
the data section and specification tests in the results section that allow us to better
assess the validity of this assumption.
1.3.5 MWTP v. Capitalization
The intention when running the hedonic specifications described above is to recover
an estimate of the MWTP for the amenity in question (here, cleanup of a proximate
brownfield site). Kuminoff and Pope (2011) note that price function estimates identi-
fied using changes in prices and amenities over time formally recover a capitalization
rate (i.e., the rate at which housing prices increase with the change in the amenity).
This may not be the same as the MWTP (i.e., the actual slope of the hedonic price
function) either before or after the amenity change. Moreover, it is hard to say a
priori which direction the difference between the capitalization effect and the MWTP
might go. As long as the hedonic price function is constant over time, there should
19
not be a difference between capitalization and MWTP. One would therefore expect
the difference between MWTP and capitalization to be smaller the shorter is the
time-period between observations.
To make this point clear, consider the simple example of two hedonic gradients
that apply to two different time periods (indexed by t = 1, 2):
P1k = ρ1 + θ1g1k + µk + 1k (1.13)
P2k = ρ2 + θ2g2k + µk + 2k
In this example, gtk indicates the policy being valued.
16 The MWTP in each period
is given by θ1 and θ2, respectively. If we were to take the difference between these
two equations in order to eliminate the fixed effect, µk, we would obtain:
∆Pk = (ρ2 − ρ1) + (θ2g1k − θ1g1k) + ∆k (1.14)
However, estimating this equation requires the (stronger than usual) assumption
that both g1k and g2k are uncorrelated with ∆k . As such, we typically assume
θ1 = θ2 = φ and instead estimate
∆Pk = ψ + φ∆gk + ∆k (1.15)
where ψ = ρ2 − ρ1. To see how this may yield biased estimates of both θ1 and θ2 ,
note the following:
φ =
B − A
g2 − g1 A = ρ1 + θ1g1 B = ρ2 + θ2g2 (1.16)
16Applied to the question of brownfield remediation, Ptk might refer to the log of the median
price in the neighborhood surrounding brownfield site k and gt,k would refer to whether that site
has been cleaned by period t. In our estimates, we allow for house-level variation in the transaction
price data. For the purposes of illustrating Kuminoff and Pope’s point, however, it is simpler to
describe the model estimated using only site-level variation.
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Therefore,
φ =
θ2g2 − θ1g1
g2 − g1 +
ρ2 − ρ1
g2 − g1 (1.17)
=
θ2g2 − θ1g1
g2 − g1 +
( θ2g1
g2 − g1 −
θ2g1
g2 − g1
)
+
ρ2 − ρ1
g2 − g1
=
g1 (θ2 − θ1)
g2 − g1 + θ2 +
ρ2 − ρ1
g2 − g1
It is therefore easy to see that, if θ2 = θ1 , φ will recover the common MWTP
estimate. However, if this is not the case, there is no reason why φ even has to lie
inside the range defined by θ1 and θ2 .
In the previous two sub-sections, we discussed estimators where the distinction
between capitalization and MWTP is a potential issue. While we can take some
comfort in the fact that we are typically relying on variation in prices over just a few
years (and, hence, the hedonic price function may not have much time to evolve),
we propose a strategy that deals explicitly with this problem in the following sub-
section. In particular, we estimate a separate hedonic price function in each year by
exploiting variation in data across treated houses in cleaned and uncleaned sites.
1.3.6 Difference-in-Differences Nearest Neighbor Matching (DD-NNM)
We begin this sub-section by returning to the specification used to estimate the
difference-in-differences model in sub-section 3.3, but allowing all of the parameters
of the hedonic price function to vary with time. Furthermore, we index each obser-
vation by i (house), t (year) and k (site near to which house i is located). Some
of the sites have been cleaned by time t (CLEANUPtk = 1) while others have not
(CLEANUPtk = 0). Note that we include the set of sites that applied for, but were
denied funding (i.e., CLEANUPtk = 0 ∀ t). Finally, we include a flexible function
of house attributes (h). We consider only transactions that occur in a particular
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year t; we therefore do not need to differentiate between a pre- and post-treatment
periods. Instead, we only need to differentiate between sites that have and have not
been cleaned:
Pitk = β0t + β1tTREATik + β2CLEANUPtk+ (1.18)
pitTREATik × CLEANUPtk + f(hitk; θt) + uitk
We begin by considering only houses in a particular year t that are inside the treat-
ment buffers of either a cleaned or an uncleaned site. As such, TREATik = 1 for all
houses in this sample,
Pitk = (β0t + β1t) + (β2 + pit)CLEANUPtk + f(hitk; θt) + uitk (1.19)
Using a nearest-neighbor matching algorithm, we pair each house inside the treat-
ment buffer in each neighborhood with CLEANUPtk = 1 with a set of J houses
that are as similar as possible in hitk and located inside the treatment buffer of a
neighborhood with CLEANUPtk = 0. We also match on the sites’ average pro-
posal scores, proposal type, whether there was a phase II assessment performed, and
restrict matches to be between sites in the same state.
Specifically, for a particular house i located in the treatment buffer of a cleaned
site (price designated by Pitk), we find the J = 5 ‘nearest neighbors’ to i, t, k (prices
denoted by P
(itk)
j .
(β2t + pit) =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
(
Pitk − 1
J
∑
j
P
(itk)
j
)
(1.20)
Next, we repeat this process using only those houses transacted in year t that are
located outside the treatment buffer (but inside 5km) in neighborhoods surrounding
sites that were not cleaned (i.e., TREATik = 0 for all of these houses). Denoting the
22
prices of houses located outside the treatment buffer with a P˜itk , we get:
β2t =
1
N˜t
N˜t∑
i=1
(
P˜itk − 1
J
∑
j
P˜
(itk)
j
)
(1.21)
As such, we are able to recover an estimate of the treatment effect on the treated for
each year t by calculating:
pit =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
(
Pitk − 1
J
∑
j
P
(itk)
j
)
− 1
N˜t
N˜t∑
i=1
(
P˜itk − 1
J
∑
j
P˜
(itk)
j
)
(1.22)
The success of this strategy, of course, depends upon being able to find high-quality
matches for houses in neighborhoods around cleaned sites from the set of houses
around sites that have not been cleaned. This is what assures that the unspecified
function f(hitk; θt) will be differenced away. By limiting comparisons to houses within
5km of sites, and by matching based on brownfield characteristics and restricting
matches to be amongst sites in the same state, moreover, we eliminate other forms
of heterogeneity at the neighborhood level.
1.4 Data
Our analysis is based on two main sources of data. In the following three subsec-
tions, we describe the data, define our pre- and post-treatment periods, and provide
summary statistics along with graphical evidence supporting our identification as-
sumptions.
1.4.1 Data Description
Data on brownfield properties are provided by the Environmental Protection Agency.
The data set includes all brownfields that applied for cleanup grants in the years
2002 through 2008. The data provide characteristics of the brownfields, including
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the exact location (latitude and longitude),17 property size (for awarded sites only),
and types of grant application (i.e. targeted to treat petroleum sites, sites with
hazardous substances, or both). A subset of this applicant pool is awarded a cleanup
grant. Generally, one brownfield is tied to one cleanup grant, although there are a
few cases where a brownfield is tied to multiple grants. For the properties that were
awarded funding, the data include related award and cleanup progress information.
Since funding for brownfields varies each year and is awarded beginning with the
highest scoring applicant and working downward until funding runs out, there is not
one score cutoff that determines whether a property is cleaned. Moreover, because
of changing scoring rules, the raw scores are difficult to compare across competition
years. To make scores comparable across years, we standardize the scores to be
between 0 and 100 by dividing the raw score by the maximum score in its respective
competition year.
Dates of different milestones in the process to remediate the brownfield exist
starting from site assessment and ending with cleanup. However, these dates are
not always available for all of the awarded and non-awarded sites, so we consider
all houses sold before any cleanup activities commence to belong to a period, ‘Pre-
cleanup.’ Next, we define an interim treatment period that starts from the earliest
recorded cleanup start date, and ends on the cleanup completion date.18 We dis-
tinguish this interim period as houses sold during this time are not exposed to the
full effect of cleanup. Lastly, we define the post-cleanup period during which prop-
erties have been fully treated with brownfield cleanup as starting with the cleanup
completion date and lasting for the duration of our sample.
17Available information describes the centroid of the brownfield property, but not property
boundaries. This is a common feature in data describing the geographic siting of locally undesirable
land uses (i.e., LULU’s). Like most of this literature, we use distance from the centroid as a measure
of exposure. Obtaining more detailed information that would allow us to measure the distance to
a site’s boundary would be desirable.
18Dates on which information are released to the public about cleanup, such as the public
announcement of grant awards, are also reasonable to consider.
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The time period dummy variables that will be used in all of the specifications
are Interimtk and Posttk, which respectively equal to 1 if a house is sold during
and after cleanup of the nearby brownfield. For the DID specification, interactions
between each of the above time period dummies with the treatment dummy are
included. In that specification, the coefficient on Treattk × Posttk is the treatment
effect on the treated, and should be interpreted with respect to the houses in the
pre-cleanup period, which is the omitted time period. There are several brownfields
where cleanup activities have not begun or are not yet complete. We retain these
brownfields for the analysis. As long as the types of brownfields that are awarded
earlier in our sample (and importantly the types of neighborhoods in which they are
situated) do not differ from those that are awarded later on, this should not affect
our estimates.
The second data source comes from Dataquick Information Systems, used under a
license agreement with the Duke Department of Economics, which provides housing
transactions data. These data contain the history of transactions and characteristics
for houses in a large number of U.S. counties. The data include information on the
sale of newly constructed houses, re-sales, refinance or equity dealings, timeshare
sales, and subdivision sales. The data saves transaction-related information such as
price, date and associated loans. For each house in the data set, the attributes are
recorded from the most recent tax assessment. The attribute fields are detailed and
include characteristics such as the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, square footage,
lot size, number of units, and number of stories. The housing assessment data also
include the latitude and longitude of each property.
In addition to house-level attributes, we control for county level effective real
estate tax (RET) rate (Siniavskaia (2011)), as defined by the percentage of the
property value that is paid in taxes every year. The county-level RET rates are
calculated using homeowner-reported home values and annual real estate taxes from
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the Census Bureau’s 2005-2009 American Community Survey.19
The set of brownfields under consideration are those tied to cleanup grant appli-
cations between 2002 and 2008. There are a total of 1383 brownfield applications
in the EPA data, 446 of which are awarded cleanup grants and 937 are not. Appli-
cants could reapply for a grant in another year following a rejection. Taking into
consideration re-applications, we identified 1178 unique brownfield properties. After
removing brownfields with missing or inaccurate longitude and latitude coordinates,
we are left with 797 sites (437 awarded and 360 non-awarded). Property locations
were individually verified with Google maps and checked to ensure that the back-
ground of the reported location corroborated with the information from the grant
proposal. Dataquick does not have housing data for all counties in which brownfields
are located; therefore, only a subset of the properties that are tied to cleanup grants
are included. Out of a total of 797 unique brownfields from the EPA data with
geocoordinates, 327 had associated housing transactions data within 5 kilometers of
only 1 brownfield site. Of those 327 sites, 197 are awarded with cleanup and 130 are
not.20 Currently, the window of observations used for housing transactions starts in
1998 (four years before the start of the brownfields program)21 and ends in 2012,
which is the last available year for housing sales.
Focusing on the housing data, our analysis limits transactions to house sales or
re-sales of owner occupied properties. Houses with missing prices, bathrooms, bed-
rooms, or square footage are dropped. Furthermore, since only housing characteris-
tics from the most recent tax assessment are recorded, any house indicated to have
undergone major improvements is dropped, as its attributes may be incorrect for
previous transactions. To reduce possible errors in record-keeping and sales anoma-
19For details, see Siniavskaia (2011).
20This figure is after removing certain locations where house attributes are missing.
21The extent of geographic coverage by Dataquick becomes much greater in 1998. Going back
further in time would require dropping more brownfield sites for lack of housing data.
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lies, the analysis excludes houses that sold more than once per year or five times
in the eleven year window of house sales.22 Prices are normalized to January 2000
dollars using the monthly, regional All Urban Consumers Housing CPI taken from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The analysis excludes the 1st and 99th percentile of
the observed price distribution.
Knowing the exact locations of all properties allows us to calculate the distance
between each house and the nearest brownfield. This is our measure of brown-
field ‘exposure’. Using Graphical Information Systems (GIS), each property is first
matched to the nearest brownfield within a 5 kilometer radius. The distances to
those brownfields are then recovered. Houses not within 5 kilometers of any brown-
field are dropped. Houses located near multiple brownfields, in which case the effect
of cleanup may be hard to measure, are dropped. The treatment and control groups
are then defined using houses within this 5 kilometer radius. Even though the houses
outside of 5 kilometers will not be used in the estimation, it is of interest to compare
differences between close (within 5 kilometers) and to those located in the rest of the
county (in addition to comparing treatment and control houses within 5 kilometers)
in order to motivate the employed definition of treatment. We define both treatment
and control groups to be contained in a small area around brownfield sites (5km) to
minimize the threat of any location-specific unobservable differences that may affect
price dynamics.
An important note is that the available EPA data describe the set of brownfield
sites associated with applications for cleanup grants. This precludes analysis of
brownfields that did not apply for funding. Therefore, it is possible that there are
brownfields (along with other locally undesirable land uses) in neighborhoods that
are not accounted for. Even though the analysis cannot control for these sites, it
22The former often represent non-arms-length transactions that can sometimes lead to multiple
transactions on the same day. The latter (i.e., more than 5 transactions in 11 years) signals that
the house may be used as an investment property by a house ‘flipper’ (Bayer et al. (2011b)).
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is unlikely that the status of these brownfields will have changed over the course
of our analysis, making them time-invariant unobservables that will be differenced
out of our analysis using several of the methods described in the previous section.
Moreover, if they do change status over time, our DID estimator will control for this
to the extent that they equally affect treatment and control groups.
1.4.2 Graphical Evidence
The next step is to determine the distance at which the control and treatment groups
are defined. We begin by estimating a pair of price functions over distance from the
nearest brownfield site - one for pre-cleanup transactions and one for post-cleanup
transactions. The distance at which the pre-cleanup and post-cleanup price functions
converge is where brownfield cleanup no longer impacts house prices; this is ideally
where we would define the cutoff between treatment and control groups.
Rather than impose a functional form for the price function, we use a local linear
polynomial estimator (Fan and Gijbels (1996)), which is described in detail in the
appendix.23 We make one modification to this procedure to account for the fact that
the mix of houses sold before and after cleanup changes with respect to distance.
In particular, Figure 1.1 describes the average square footage of houses sold at each
distance from a brownfield site before and after cleanup. It is clear from this figure
that houses sold before cleanup of brownfield sites within approximately 2km tend
to be larger than those sold in that same buffer after cleanup. We therefore control
parametrically for house attributes before recovering the non-parametric relationship
between house prices and distance in Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2 also controls parametri-
cally for year effects to allow for general inflationary trends, differences in brownfield
characteristics including the proposal scores, proposal type, and the number of times
23The bandwidth, determined by inspection, is three times Silverman’s Rule of Thumb. For the
distance gradient, this is about 308 meters. For the time gradient, it is approximately 381 days. A
Gaussian kernel is used for weighting.
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the sites are assessed.24
Figure 1.2 provides evidence in support of the assumption that houses that are
‘far’ enough from the brownfield represent a valid control group. While we find that
houses at all distances have higher prices on average after cleanup, we find that this
difference narrows outside of 2030 meters. Taking the treatment group to be defined
by a 2030m buffer, the simple DID estimator will compare the average change in
prices before assessment and after cleanup inside the buffer with the similarly defined
change outside the buffer. We demonstrate the sensitivity of some of our results to
the assumed buffer size in the following section.
Given the definition of the treatment and control groups, a natural way to check
whether the common trend assumption is reasonable is to compare the price trends
of the treatment and control groups pre- and post-treatment. If the common trend
assumption is valid, then price trends should exhibit a few characteristics. First, if
the relationship between price and cleanup is causal, one would expect a significant
price increase for treatment houses around the time of cleanup, as opposed to a
gradual upward trend in price. This would support the claim that cleanup in fact
leads to an increase in prices of houses near brownfields. Second, the price trends of
the two groups in the pre-cleanup period should be relatively similar (i.e., common
trends before cleanup). Third, in the post-cleanup period, the prices of the control
houses should not change significantly, but rather should follow a path similar to
that in the pre-treatment period. The latter two characteristics would suggest that
price trends for houses near brownfields would have been the same as those far from
brownfields had they not been treated with cleanup.
Figure 1.3 plots the prices of treatment (i.e., inside 2030m) and control houses
24All brownfields must undergo Phase I and II site assessments. Under certain circumstances,
however, additional testing may be advised by a Licensed Site Professional, and a supplemental
site assessment is conducted. Recognizing those sites that demand additional testing may control
for differences in the severity of contamination at sites.
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against time relative to the cleanup date.25 The trends pre- and post-treatment
are similar for the two groups. While both groups exhibit a jump at the point of
treatment, suggesting that some of the treatment may spill-out into the control group,
the discontinuity for the control group going from pre- to post-cleanup (-0.33%) is
smaller than that in the treatment group (6.55%). The differences-in-differences
approach measures the jump in the treatment group relative to that in the control
group.
1.4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 provides summary statistics for the brownfields in the sample. The table
provides statistics for subsets of brownfields by housing data availability in order to
examine the representativeness of the sample after data cuts and merges. Columns
(1) - (3) and (4) - (6), respectively, summarize characteristics of the subsets of brown-
fields with and without Dataquick housing data. Tests for the equality of group
means for the various attributes across these subsets are provided in columns (7)
and (8). Table 1.3 suggests that proposal scores are marginally higher for non-funded
brownfields in locations with Dataquick data, compared to non-funded brownfields
in locations without Dataquick data. The difference is not statistically significant for
the set of funded properties. Hazardous substances contamination is more common
in the funded brownfields for which we do not have housing data; since Dataquick
does not provide data for many rural communities, significant differences may reflect
the more common occurrence of certain types of brownfields in more urbanized areas.
Table 1.4 provides summary statistics for house attributes by treatment status.
Columns (1) - (2) and (3) - (4), respectively, summarize the housing characteristics for
the treatment group (within 2030m of a brownfield) and the control group (between
25As was the case when generating Figure 1.2, we parametrically control for housing attributes,
year effects, and brownfield characteristics before non-parametrically estimating price as a function
of time relative to the cleanup period.
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2030m and 5km of a brownfield). Columns (5) and (6) test for equality of group
means. Although we reject the equality of means for many attributes, we do take
comfort in the fact that the differences are far smaller than in Table 1.1, which
compares houses within 5km to houses in the rest of the county. We take Table
1.4 as evidence that there are important differences between treatment and control
groups that should be accounted for parametrically in the DID specification.
Table 1.5 provides a yearly breakdown of cleanup starts and completions for the
brownfields that were awarded cleanup grant funding.26 Since the Brownfields Law
was only recently enacted in 2002, many cleanup completions occur towards the end
of the window of observations, which limits the number of post-cleanup transactions
we have to work with. Table 1.6 reports the mean cleanup duration by toxin-found
and media of contamination. The average cleanup duration for all brownfields for
which we can calculate durations is approximately 444 days with a standard deviation
of 451 days. These figures imply that brownfield cleanups are relatively quick (e.g.,
in comparison to the cleanup of a Superfund site); this requires that we use high-
frequency housing data (i.e., daily transactions information) for estimation.
Even with the relatively short average duration of brownfield cleanup, right-
censoring (i.e., cleanups that are not completed by the end of our sample) is still
an issue - particularly for cleanups begun in later years. Table 1.7 describes the
fraction of cleanups initiated in each year that were not completed by 2011.27 Not
surprisingly, cleanups begun later in the sample are less likely to be completed. There
is, however, a significant fraction of cleanups with petroleum contamination begun
early in the sample that have not been completed by 2012.
We find that being near a brownfield site that has been cleaned yields prices
26There are 2 sites that began cleanup before the 2002 - one for areas with Dataquick coverage,
and without. These are likely from pilot programs that receive funding before the formal program
began.
27There were no cleanups initiated in 2012 from the pool of awarded sites between 2002 and
2008.
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that are consistently lower than houses that are not near sites (by -3.23% to -9.11%,
depending upon the buffer size), and lower than values of houses that are near brown-
field sites in any other state of cleanup activity. The coefficients for BF indicates
that prices are marginally lower for houses located near an untreated site.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Cross-Sectional Estimates
Table 1.8 reports the results of our cross-sectional specification described in equation
1.1, where we restrict the comparison to be between houses that are in the vicinity of
brownfields - some of which have been cleaned, others of which have not. We find that
the value of cleanup is negative at -11.3%. The counterintuitive sign of this effect may
be a result of omitted variables bias if cleanup grants are targeted towards struggling
neighborhoods. Table 1.8 suggests that unobservable neighborhood attributes may
be correlated with their cleanup status, necessitating a different empirical approach.
1.5.2 Fixed Effect Estimates
Next, we use the fixed effects specification described in equation 1.5, which controls
for time-invariant unobservables associated with neighborhoods. These unobserv-
ables can be the source of bias that leads to the counterintuitive results found in
the cross-sectional specifications. The fixed effects specification uses all houses in a
buffer; we consider buffers of 1000, 2000m, 3000m, and 5000m to demonstrate ro-
bustness. We also include controls for year fixed effects, house attributes, and the
real estate tax rate. The results of the fixed effects specification, described in Table
1.9, differ strikingly from the cross-sectional results, with increases in house prices
from cleanup that range between 6.24% and 11.1%, depending on the size of the
buffer.28
28Only the Fixed Effect estimate using a buffer at 2000 meters is significant using cluster-robust
standard errors.
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1.5.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimates (DID)
While it is able to deal with time-invariant unobservable neighborhood attributes,
the fixed effects specification described in Table 10 does nothing to control for time-
varying unobservables that may be correlated with brownfield cleanup. Estimates
would still be biased if, for example, cleanup were systematically directed towards
locations that were improving in unobservable ways. The DID approach overcomes
this problem with the ‘common trends’ assumption - namely, that the change over
time in unobservables in the control group is the same as it would have been in
the treatment group in the absence of treatment. By assigning the control group
to be houses in the same neighborhood as those in the treatment group, but far
enough away from the site to not be impacted by cleanup, we try to satisfy this
assumption and obtain estimates that account for any time-varying unobservables
that are common to both the treatment and control groups. Moreover, by differencing
over time, the DID approach also controls for time-invariant unobservables just as
the fixed effects specification did.
As described in Section 3, the average treatment effect on the treated is mea-
sured by the coefficient on the interaction of the indicators for a house being in the
treatment group (Treat) and its transaction occurring after the cleanup has been
completed (Post). These estimates can be found in the fifth row of Table 1.10. With
only year fixed effects and brownfield-level controls, we find a treatment effect of
5.81% using the preferred buffer size of 2030m. In a specification that includes year
fixed effects, house-level and brownfield-level controls, and controls for the real es-
tate tax, this effect increases to 7.15%. Further introducing brownfield fixed effects
decreases this effect to 4.85%, which is significant at the 10% after clustering stan-
dard errors at the brownfield level. In the specification with brownfield fixed effects,
the estimate for the cleanup interim interaction additionally reveals that cleanup
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might slightly depress housing values compared to the houses in the same area that
are located outside of the exposure buffer, suggesting that cleanup effort, though on
average fairly quick, can be disruptive.
1.5.4 Difference-in-Differences Nearest Neighbor Matching Estimates (DD-NNM)
Both the fixed effects and DID approaches rely on the strong assumption that the
hedonic price function remains stable over time. If cleanup activities initiate neigh-
borhood turnover, the identities of those living in close proximity to the site may
change, and with them, marginal willingness to pay may change as well. In fact,
Kuminoff and Pope (2011) demonstrate that estimates of the hedonic price function
may provide no information about MWTP. As such, one needs a method that both
controls for unobservables that may be correlated with cleanup activities while not
relying on time variation. The difference in differences nearest neighbor matching
estimator described in Section 3 is designed to do this.
Estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated (pi) are recovered without
using time variation by taking the difference between two sets of parameter estimates
- one derived by comparing houses inside the treatment buffer of cleaned sites to
houses inside the treatment buffers of uncleaned sites (β2 +pi), and the other derived
by comparing houses in the control groups of cleaned sites to houses in the control
groups of uncleaned sites (β2). Table 1.11 describes these estimates for our preferred
buffer size of 2030 using J = 5 matches. Estimates and standard errors are based on
Abadie and Imbens (2006).
We do not consider results for 2004, since there is not enough post cleanup obser-
vations for estimation. For 2005 and 2007, results based on inside-buffer comparisons
are not statistically significant, but results are significant for both comparisons in
other years. In particular, we find cleanup effects of 16.1% to 37.7%. Since our
aim is to estimate the benefits from cleaning up brownfield sites, we also consider
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limiting the post-cleanup period to end at most 3 years after the cleanup completion
date in Table 1.12, as brownfield cleanup can trigger other types of neighborhood
redevelopment activities that are not directly tied to the cleanup itself. Using at
most 3 years after cleanup, the DD-NNM estimator finds effects of 10.7% to 24.8%.29
These results suggest that we can indeed interpret our results as implying a positive
and significant willingness to pay for brownfield remediation (i.e., a welfare interpre-
tation). The fixed effects estimator, which estimates an 11.1% increase in housing
values, is comparable to the smallest of the DD-NNM estimator. Compared with the
results of the fixed effects and DID specifications, these larger estimates suggest that
changes in the price function over time may have indeed had the effect of reducing
the estimated MWTP.
1.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Finally, we can address the simple question, ‘is brownfield remediation worth it?’
In answering this question, we take a conservative approach. First, we take our
most conservative estimate of the cleanup effect - the difference-in-differences esti-
mate based on a 2030m treatment buffer (4.85%), rather than the larger estimates
generated by the fixed effect and DD-NNM specifications. Next, we take a conser-
vative estimate of the value of housing that sold inside the treatment buffer prior
to cleanup. Ideally, we would like to measure the total value of all housing units
inside each buffer prior to the start of cleanup, but we do not observe every house
sell during that pre-cleanup period. Rather than try to impute values for houses
that we do not see transact during that period, we take the conservative approach of
aggregating the value of only the houses that do sell in the 5 years prior to the start
of cleanup inside the treatment buffer. We are able to construct this aggregate value
29Estimates are fairly robust to using matches of different sizes (See Tables 1.13 and 1.14 for
estimates using J=10 matches).
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for 51 of the brownfields - $4,019,624,960. Multiplying by 4.85% yields an estimate
of the aggregate increase in housing value owing to cleanup of $194,951,811. This
represents a benefit of aggregate value per site of $3,822,585. If the $200,000 EPA
cleanup grant represented just 1/10th of the total cleanup cost, brownfield remedia-
tion would still pass a cost-benefit analysis. This result would be even stronger if we
considered all the properties located inside the treatment buffer, a larger treatment
buffer, or one of our larger treatment effect estimates.
1.7 Discussion
The EPA’s Brownfields Program provides grants to assess and cleanup properties the
‘expansion, re-development, or re-use of which may be complicated by the presence
or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.’ In this
paper, we quantify the benefits associated with these remediation activities using
property value hedonic techniques. As is typically the case in property value hedonic
applications, omitted neighborhood attributes have the potential to bias these esti-
mates. Indeed, our evidence suggests that neighborhoods that successfully cleanup
brownfields under the program may be worse in other unobserved dimensions.
We offer a slate of quasi-experimental approaches to overcome this problem, in-
cluding simple neighborhood fixed effects, a difference-in-differences approach that
relies on a treatment and control group defined by geographic proximity, and a
difference-in-differences nearest neighbor matching estimator that exploits the ad-
vantages of our treatment and control group definitions while not requiring that
the hedonic price function remain stable over time. These alternative specifications
yield a consistent conclusion - averaging over the experiences at a large number
of brownfield properties, cleanup leads to housing price increases between 4.9% and
24.8%. Taking the most conservative estimate of the value of an average site cleanup,
we find that it indeed passes cost-benefit analysis by an order of magnitude based
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on the expenditures from the Brownfields program. Moreover, our estimate using a
difference-in-differences matching estimator without time variation is consistent with
a willingness to pay (i.e., welfare) interpretation, not simply a capitalization effect.
Aside from the empirical application in Kuminoff and Pope (2011), this is the only
other empirical evidence that demonstrates the Kuminoff and Pope (2011) result.
It suggests that caution must be exercised for assuming time-constant hedonic price
functions in policy evaluation if the policy under consideration induces large enough
changes such that the population considered before treatment is inherently different
from the one after.
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Table 1.5: Timeline of Brownfield Start and Completion Frequencies
With Dataquick Data Without Dataquick Data
Starts Completions Starts Completions
2000 1
2001 1
2002 1 1
2003 4 2
2004 23 6 17 5
2005 37 12 23 13
2006 35 35 36 18
2007 23 24 28 26
2008 30 17 34 27
2009 30 23 17 33
2010 8 22 8 14
2011 1 1 2
43
Table 1.6: Brownfield Cleanup Duration (in Days) by Contaminant
Contaminant Funding Type Mean St. Dev. Obs.
Petroleum only 444.08 468.75 60
Hazardous Substances only 442.72 449.64 210
Contaminant Found
Controlled Substances 741.90 645.86 10
Asbestos 493.62 476.18 86
PCBs 489.58 468.92 45
VOCs 501.88 464.46 108
Lead 445.65 415.13 156
Other Metals 438.97 436.78 117
PAHs 448.07 436.83 117
Other 495.85 520.38 75
Unknown 383.00 513.36 2
Media of Contamination Mean sd N
Soil 464.06 450.36 234
Air 329.33 289.09 12
Surface Water 356.00 282.92 21
Groundwater 520.44 499.20 126
Drinking Water 634.00 1
Sediments 422.45 441.28 11
Unknown 456.00 359.05 7
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Table 1.8: Cross-Sectional Specification
Comparison of Houses Near Cleaned versus
Not Cleaned Brownfields (within 5km)
VARIABLES All within 5km
Cleanedup -0.113***
(0.00275)
Constant 11.52***
(0.140)
Obs. 469,928
R-squared 0.481
Controls
Year Fixed Effects x
Brownfield Characteristics x
House Controls x
BF Fixed Effects
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample used includes only houses inside buffer 5 km around a funded
brownfield that has been cleaned or an unfunded brownfield. Cleanedup = 1
if the house is near a funded site has been cleaned.
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Table 1.10: Differences-in-Differences (b=2030m)
VARIABLES
Treat -0.0477*** -0.0492*** -0.0458***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.017)
Interim 0.237*** 0.114*** 0.104***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.039)
Post 0.149*** 0.00116 0.0749**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.037)
Interim × Treat -0.0799*** -0.0379*** -0.0191
(0.009) (0.007) (0.023)
Post × Treat 0.0581*** 0.0715*** 0.0485*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.029)
Constant 13.97*** 13.40*** 11.23***
(0.022) (0.199) (0.169)
Obs. 370,910 370,910 370,910
R-squared 0.087 0.471 0.380
Number of Brownfields 197
Controls
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Brownfield Characteristics X X
House Controls X X
BF Fixed Effects X
Note: Cluster-Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Treatment
buffer = 2030m. Sample used includes only houses (i) around awarded brownfields, and (ii) inside 5km
buffer. Treat = 1 if house is within b buffer in meters. Post = 1 if transaction occurs after nearby
brownfield is cleaned. Interim = 1 if transaction occurs during cleanup.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Average Square Footage of Houses Transacted by Distance from Brown-
field Before v. After Remediation With 99% Confidence Intervals
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Figure 1.2: Non-Parametric Price Function Estimates Before and After Remedia-
tion With 99% Confidence Intervals
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Figure 1.3: Non-Parametric Price Function Estimates Relative to Cleanup Period
for Treatment and Control Houses With 95% Confidence Intervals
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1.10 Appendix: Local Polynomial Modeling of the Hedonic Price
Gradient
Let (X10 , . . . , X
j
0 , . . . , X
k
0 ) be a set of k equally-spaced focal points on the support
of the variable defining distance from brownfield. Using k focal points divides the
support of distance into k + 1 intervals of length
l =
distmax − distmin
k + 1
where Xj0 = distmin + l × j for j = 1, 2, . . . k. We fit a linear function for each focal
point:
Pi | Xj0 = a+ b · disti + i
where Pi is the price for house i and X
j
0 is distance. The covariate and the focal points
used in the kernel weight are normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
The problem is to minimize the following weighted sum of squared residuals,
n∑
i=1
(
Pi − [a+ b(disti −Xj0)]
)2 ·Kh(disti −Xj0
σˆ
)
where Kh(·) is a Gaussian kernel; i.e. Kh(z) = 1hKh( zh) = 1hφ( zh) , and σˆ is the
estimated standard deviation of the covariate, Xi . The smoothing parameter h is
chosen according to three times Silverman’s Rule of Thumb, which states:
h =
1.06σˆ
n1/5
Comparing the price gradients with respect to distance pre- and post- treatment,
the estimates find that the difference becomes close to 0 at a distance from the
brownfield of about 2 kilometers. Price gradients with respect to time are estimated
similarly where the X variable is instead the days relative to cleanup initiation and
completion.
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2Learning in a Hedonic Framework: Valuing
Brownfield Remediation
2.1 Motivation
In the absence of prices for environmental amenities, hedonic property value models
have been widely used as a revealed-preference approach to measuring the value in-
dividuals place on non-marketed goods. Rosen (1974) provided the theoretical foun-
dations for interpreting the marginal equilibrium price of a non-marketed good as an
individual’s marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the good. Based on this model,
many researchers have focused on recovering consistent estimates of the MWTP for
amenities using changes in property values under quasi-experimental settings. Some
examples include Chay and Greenstone (2005), Linden and Rockoff (2008), and Pope
(2008). These studies exploit an exogenous change in a good (usually due to a policy
shift) to establish a causal relationship between the amenity change and changes in
local housing prices. The capitalization of the policy change into housing prices is
then interpreted as the average MWTP for the amenity. Haninger et al. (2012) sim-
ilarly exploits temporal and spatial variation in housing exposure to contaminated
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sites known as brownfields to estimate the capitalization of brownfield cleanup into
local housing prices. What is crucial for these studies to recover unbiased estimates
of the MWTP is that prices in the pre-policy period represent a valid baseline to
which post-policy prices can be compared. However, this is likely to be complicated
by the substantial provision of information to homeowners that accompanies policies
such as brownfield remediation before the policy is implemented. Specifically, if con-
sumers infer from information provided that cleanup of a nearby brownfield is likely
(forward-looking behavior) or gain information about the severity of the brownfield
contamination (learning from new information), then the baseline period prices need
to be adjusted to consider these two effects as they may drive potential distortions
to the MWTP estimate if left unaccounted for.
This paper considers distortions in policy valuation of non-marketed goods from
not accounting for two types of household behaviors - an expectations bias from
forward-looking behavior and an information bias due to learning from information
provision. To address these two sources of bias, I incorporate learning into a dy-
namic hedonic framework. Using brownfield remediation as an application, I model
a household’s residential location decision as a dynamic, discrete neighborhood-choice
problem, where households update their knowledge of brownfield hazard information
in a Bayesian fashion before making decisions on where to live. Furthermore, I collect
a new data set on brownfield hazard information, which allows me to test my model
and estimate the bias. Since information provision is prevalent in policies under
many settings, it is my hope to develop a general framework that can be applied to
other areas in the future.1 Section 2 describes these two information-related sources
of bias in more detail, as well as other research that has addressed these biases. As
part of the model is tailored to learning about a specific amenity, I next describe the
1Some examples of other amenities with public information provision include air quality, crime
and school quality.
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amenity of interest, a brownfield, in section 3. Section 4 then outlines a model of
neighborhood choice that incorporates learning and forward-looking behavior. Sec-
tion 5 gives summary statistics and discusses other data sources, followed by section
6, which describes the estimation procedure. Finally, I present the results in section
7, and conclude in section 8.
2.2 Two Sources of Information Bias
2.2.1 Expectation Bias
Rosen (1974) models households as static utility-maximizers. However, if individuals
are forward-looking, their choices of amenities in the current period will reflect ex-
pectations for how these amenities may evolve, which will subsequently be reflected
in transaction prices. This is most applicable in decisions relating to durable goods,
such as that to purchase a house, given the size of the investment as well as the
large costs associated with moving. Using a static framework to interpret MWTP
from changes in housing prices will therefore confound the estimate with individual
expectations about the future. This is exacerbated in the case of valuing the impacts
of an amenity-related policy if there is sufficient information provision before the
policy is implemented. Information provided may cause the policy of interest to be
anticipated and drive an even greater expectations bias in the estimated MWTP.
In the environmental economics literature, studies have examined the role of
information in the evaluation of environmental risk. Some examples include Brook-
shire et al. (1985), Hallstrom and Smith (2005), and McCluskey and Rausser (2003).
These hedonic studies model the impact of information using a static, expected
utility framework, where information changes affect individual choices through the
probability of a certain (bad) event occurring. This is essentially a static approach
to accounting for forward-looking behavior: households receive information about
an amenity or event of interest, which in turn affects their perceptions of how the
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amenity will change, or the likelihood of the event occurring in the future. The recent
urban and environmental economics literatures have seen dynamic structural models
such as those of Bayer et al. (2011a), Bishop and Murphy (2011), Bishop (2012), and
Mastromonaco (2011) that specify individual preferences and maximizing behavior
to account for the forward-looking nature of household decisions. They employ the
recent advances in models of dynamic discrete choice (Hotz and Miller (1993), Ar-
cidiacono and Miller (2011)) to estimate the parameters of a household’s MWTP
curve for time-varying neighborhood amenities (e.g. crime and air pollution). The
same logic applies to fixed amenities as well, since households may change their ex-
pectations of how likely a fixed (dis)amenity will exist in the future based on, among
other things, information provided in the time leading up to the policy change.
2.2.2 Learning Bias
A second source of bias relates to information provision and learning from the in-
formation that is provided. Public disclosures may change what is known about an
amenity. Many policies regarding the cleanup of a hazard will provide information to
affected households before any remedial actions are taken. Furthermore, information
regarding the amenities may be released in multiple waves. Suppose a household
lives near an aesthetically displeasing site, and then learns that the site is not only
unattractive but is also contaminated with low levels of carcinogens. It is likely
that measured preference for the site will be different depending on whether baseline
prices were measured before the information was released or after. Practically, this
means that the estimated MWTP will depend on when one takes prices as baseline
even if agents are assumed to be myopic. A solution could be to limit the use of
baseline prices to those of houses sold after all relative information is released but
before the policy is implemented. However, data in this narrow time frame may be
sparse. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the home-purchase decision encourages
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forward-looking behavior. Prices transacted right before a policy (e.g. brownfield
cleanup) is implemented, may alleviate information bias, but could more heavily
reflect the expectation that the nearby brownfield will be cleaned.
Previous work in environmental economics have recognized the importance of
household knowledge of disamenities at the time of property transactions in the con-
text of property value hedonics (Schulze et al. (1986), Michaels and Smith (1990),
Gayer et al. (2000), Sanders (2013)). However, these papers have not explicitly mod-
eled how information transmission may affect locational choices, which can be used
to recover estimates from counterfactual scenarios that are important for policymak-
ing. Other literatures provide examples of modeling learning’s effect on individual
choices (Ackerberg (2003), James (2011), Chan and Hamilton (2006), Chernew et al.
(2008)). Although there are important differences in how information is acquired and
processed between my paper and the latter group of papers, property value hedonic
models are nonetheless derived from choices made by individuals, and thus learning
from information released about nearby amenities should be considered. Whether
the learning matters and is systematically priced into housing values is an empirical
question, and depending on the answer, may affect the validity of MWTP estimates.
2.3 A Context for Brownfields
The disamenity of interest in my application is a brownfield. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) defines a brownfield as a ‘real property, the expansion,
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant’ (EPA (2012)). In 2002,
the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act was signed as
an amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980. This created the EPA Brownfields program, which aimed to
assist organizations in the redevelopment of brownfield lands through the provision of
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grants. The set of brownfield sites considered are those that submitted cleanup grant
applications to this program from 2003 to 2008.2 Data on brownfield sites originated
from the EPA and were compiled by Kevin Haninger for the aforementioned work on
brownfields (Haninger et al. (2012)). Crucial to the current paper, the data contain
site information (exact location), applicant information, and dates relative to cleanup
(if awarded).
The EPA brownfields data include detailed information regarding site remedi-
ation. However, in order to account for learning, the data need to be augmented
with information updates about brownfield contamination. I infer the information
available to households by collecting data from assessment reports, which document
investigations into brownfield sites. The Massachusetts Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (MA-DEP) maintains an online database of contaminated sites, with
uploads of original and/or scanned assessment documents. Each report contains a
myriad of information regarding the history of investigative efforts and environmen-
tal condition of the site known at the time of the assessment (See Figures 1 and 2 for
an example). Each site can have several associated assessment documents, ranging
from the mid-1980s to the present. Consequently, for most sites, I can capture all in-
vestigations and associated results since the inception of the land as a contaminated
site.
Implicit in the use of these assessments as a measure of general informed-ness
is an assumption that households will retain information from investigations as the
assessments are published. Since the database for contaminated sites is public infor-
mation, households can retrieve information on sites by directly searching for them
online, similar to what I have done. Furthermore, the Massachusetts Contingency
Plan (MCP)3 requires that legal notices for specific response action milestones be
2A drawback is that I do not observe information about brownfields that did not submit an
application.
3The MCP is a set of official guidelines established by the state of Massachusetts regarding how
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published in local newspapers in affected or potentially affected communities (For an
example of a public notice, see Figure 3.). Given this, it seems plausible to assume
that households can rely on these assessments to stay informed.
To construct the contamination data, I first match the brownfields in Mas-
sachusetts from the EPA data with those in the MA-DEP online database using
address information. Next, I read through each assessment for information related
to the investigation such as the date when assessment activities began, the date
when the assessment was posted online, and the contaminants found to exceed state-
defined thresholds in each exposure pathway (e.g. Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
(PAH) found in soil, as opposed to PAH found in groundwater). It is important to
note that whether a site is designated as contaminated depends not only on the
measured contamination levels at a site, but also on whether exposure risk was high.
Specifically, the thresholds for contamination would be lower if there existed any
institutions (schools) or environmental areas of concern (habitats) near the site. The
thresholds are not available for all assessments, but it is important to account for
them as they may affect the way in which households perceive released information.
As a proxy for this, I use the Numerical Ranking System (NRS), which was de-
veloped by the MA-DEP to score a site according to the extent of a site’s hazards
and potential damage to its surroundings. According to MA-DEP regulations, a
site must be classified using the NRS within a year of a toxin release notification
(of Environmental Protection (2009)). The actual NRS score is constructed from the
sum of five subscores, where subscores IV and V are respectively for the categories
of Human Population and Land Uses, and Ecological Population. I retain subscores
IV and V as a way of measuring the institutional and environmental areas of concern
that may contribute to the assessment of the contamination. The NRS is only used
when an initial release of hazard material is discovered, therefore I only observe one
to conduct investigations and cleanup for contaminated properties.
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NRS score for most sites even though a site’s surroundings may change.4 This mea-
sure is imperfect. However, given the time frame of this paper, significant changes
in institutions are likely limited, which leads me to believe that the NRS score is a
reasonable proxy.5 In addition, I record some historical information about the site
including the year it became abandoned, and the type of business that had previously
occupied the site. In total, I have located 65 sites in Massachusetts that map to the
EPA data set, and have recorded information from between 1 and 5 assessments for
each of these sites.
2.4 Model
Following previous work on dynamic locational choice (Bayer et al. (2011a), Bishop
and Murphy (2011), Bishop (2012)), I model households making a sequence of res-
idential location decisions in a finite-horizon framework. A simplification in my
model as compared to that in Bayer et al. (2011a) is that I abstract from wealth
accumulation and use moving costs as the driving factor for forward-looking behav-
ior. Since the primary focus of this paper is to accommodate learning in a hedonic
setting, this simplification seems reasonable given that it yields significant reductions
to computational burden without compromising the paper’s primary goal.
In each period, a household chooses whether to move, and conditional on moving,
chooses the neighborhood that yields the highest value of expected lifetime utility.
In practice, a neighborhood will be defined as a Census Tract. Household i’s choice
set at time t is described by J + 1 alternatives, where alternative J + 1 represents
the choice to stay in its current residence.6 In addition, if a household chooses to
4There are a few exceptions where scores are revised.
5Furthermore, a brief survey of the available thresholds in assessments shows that they very
rarely change over time.
6If a household chooses a house within the same tract, it is considered a move and not a stay
decision.
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move, it incurs a moving cost in the same period.
The information structure of the model is such that households are uncertain
about the transitions of neighborhood amenities in the future, but fully observe all
neighborhood amenities in the current period with the exception of brownfield haz-
ard. With regards to brownfield hazard, households only have imperfect information
about a site’s potential effect on health, and whether it will be remediated. In the
face of this uncertainty over ‘true’ hazard levels, households can make inferences
based on the results of periodic site assessments. Once their knowledge has been
updated with the most recent assessment information, they can subsequently form
a guess of how likely a particular site will be remediated after they have moved into
a neighborhood.
The timing of the household’s decision process is as follows, where the decision
period is 2 years in length. At the beginning of time t, a household first makes
appropriate updates to its beliefs about brownfield hazards if new information is
available, and predicts whether sites will be remediated after they have moved in
(if it has not already been cleaned). It then forms expectations over how other
neighborhood amenities will change in future periods. Finally, after forming beliefs
and expectations over attributes of neighborhoods that it has uncertainty over, the
household chooses a place to locate for the rest of period t.
In the following subsections, I first detail the structure of the assessments, the
learning process using the assessments, and then set up the household’s problem.
2.4.1 Assessments
Environmental site assessments characterize the overall condition of a brownfield.
The published results from these assessments serve as noisy signals about brownfield
hazards. I quantify the assessment results into the sum of the total contaminants
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in each medium of contamination that exceed state toxin thresholds.7 I assume
that an assessment result for a site k in neighborhood j, ckt, depends on the ‘true’,
unobserved brownfield hazard level, denoted Hk, which does not vary over time.
Households are also aware that these results additionally depend on the institutional
and environmental settings around the site, IEk. These IE settings determine the
appropriate state thresholds with which to compare findings on toxin levels. As
discussed in the previous section, different thresholds account for the use of more
stringent standards when, for example, a school is located near a site. In absence of
data on the thresholds, the NRS subscores for human and ecological populations will
serve as proxies. Assessment results for a site k in neighborhood j are then given by
2.4.1c˜kt = Hk + λ · IEk + ekt (2.1)
where ekt has an assumed i.i.d. normal distribution around 0 with variance σe,
and λ is a parameter on the institutional and environmental settings around the
site. Rather than directly using the count of the contamination, ckt, in equation ,
I reparameterize the contamination as c˜kt = log (1 + ckt) in order to make hazard
beliefs in neighborhoods with sites comparable to those without.8 Since assessments
do not occur in every period, a household at time t will refer to the information
provided up to the most recent site assessment to form beliefs.
2.4.2 Learning
If a site has never undergone an assessment, households are assumed to have prior
beliefs about hazards in the neighborhood that are distributed normally around H0
with variance δ. When new assessment information becomes available, they compare
7For example, an assessment that finds lead contamination in soil and groundwater at a site
yields a result of 2. In practice, I use 7 categories for contaminants, and 4 categories for the media
of contamination. Categories are listed in Table 3 of the Appendix.
8Using the learning process detailed next in 4.2, signals are log normal so that only areas without
sites can have a c˜kt of 0, i.e. a hazard belief level that approaches negative infinity.
66
the new results with their prior beliefs and information received thus far to form
updated beliefs. In particular, a signal for the hazard will be the difference between
the new contamination results and the component attributable to the IE settings
near the site,
sigkt = c˜kt − λ · IEk = Hk + ekt (2.2)
The noise of each signal, in the context of contamination assessments, may result from
variation in testing conditions or sampling methods at the time of the assessment.
As households cannot separately disentangle the noise from the true hazard quality
in each signal, the true quality of the brownfield can only be revealed after multiple
signals. How quickly the true hazard is revealed depends on how noisy the signals
are (in particular, in the case when signals have no noise, σe = 0, households can
learn the true hazard level after one signal). Given the distributional assumptions on
prior beliefs and the noise of the signals, household posterior beliefs will be normally
distributed (DeGroot (1970)). The mean and variance of their hazard beliefs for a
brownfield k in neighborhood j after receiving signals up to period t are given by
Et(Hk) = Vt(Hk)
[
V −1t−1(Hk) · Et−1(Hk) + σ−1e · sigkt
]
(2.3)
Vt(Hk) =
[
V −1t−1(Hk) + σ
−1
e
]−1
These beliefs will serve as state variables that households factor into their neighbor-
hood location decisions. Since there may be multiple brownfields within a neighbor-
hood, households are assumed to learn about each brownfield separately, and then
combine this information into beliefs for the overall hazard level for the neighborhood
as {EtHj, VtHj}.9
9In this model, learning about a particular brownfield site occurs independently of other sites,
although this can be relaxed.
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2.4.3 Household Preferences
Household indirect flow utility from living in a neighborhood depends on the flow
cost of housing, Rjt, the characteristics of the neighborhood j, and more generally
the district in which the neighborhood is located, rj. Neighborhood characteristics
at t that are observable to the econometrician are summarized in Xjt, and include
attributes such as crime, school quality, and poverty levels. Attributes that are
unobserved by the econometrician, from which the household draws utility, are cap-
tured by ξjt. Also included in neighborhood attributes is the brownfield hazard,
Hjt, which is neither observed by the econometrician or the household. This haz-
ard only affects utility if brownfields in tract j are not remediated by the end of t,
which the household believes to depend on the results of site assessments and other
brownfield-specific characteristics. The final component of flow utility consists of
costs to moving. A portion of this cost involves a financial moving cost that a house-
hold incurs if it chooses to move, MCit. These are calculated as 6% of the value of
the house a household moves from to represent the amount paid in realtor fees.10
Another portion involves a psychological cost if it moves away from the district in
which it was located last period. The last part depends on the distance it would
have to travel to move to a specific neighborhood since farther moves can be more
costly. This is denoted dist(j, ·) for a move to neighborhood j. Let household i’s
choice of neighborhood at time t be denoted by dit, and let the neighborhood vari-
ables (including hazard beliefs) and moving costs be summarized by sit. Given the
neighborhood characteristics and household beliefs over the true hazard, household
i’s expected utility of living in neighborhood j at time t takes the following linear
10Note that implies that conditional on moving, the household faces the same financial moving
cost regardless of where it moves to. Values of what a house would have sold for if a household
chooses to stay will be imputed.
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form,
uijt(sit) + ijt = βXXjt + βRRjt + βHE
(
eHj × 1[cleanjt = 0] | sit
)
+ ξjt (2.4)
+ 1[dit 6= J + 1] ·
(
βMC ·MCit + βPMC · 1[rj 6= rdit−1 ] + βddist(j, dit−1)
)
+ ijt
where 1[·] denotes the indicator function, and ijt is an idiosyncratic shock to util-
ity. Some comments are in order regarding the term relating to hazard. First, the
hazard enters the utility exponentially to make hazard levels in neighborhoods with
sites comparable to those without and those that have been cleaned. Second, there
is evidence from cleanup grant application guides that the likelihood of award, aside
from assessment results and site characteristics, may be higher for brownfields in
localities that are either better at applying for grants (e.g. have more resources) or
have more financial or socioeconomic needs. I will therefore allow cleanup to addi-
tionally depend on district- and tract- level characteristics. District-level variables
include per capita spending and the unemployment rate. Tract-level characteristics
include the percentage of people, in the year 2000, who are Black and Hispanic in
the neighborhood where the brownfield is located. Site characteristics include the
most recent contamination signal, the cumulative number of assessments performed,
a dummy variable for groundwater contamination, and a dummy variable for whether
a brownfield grant proposal was submitted. I summarize these other variables that
the household perceives to affect cleanup award in Zjt, which I will include in the set
of state variables. Lastly, I assume that the beliefs for site hazard and cleanup are
independent conditional on the state variables (which, most importantly, includes
the contamination signals). This assumption requires the random component that
determines whether a site is cleaned, which is not controlled for in sit (e.g. an
incomplete application, or a particularly low EPA budget in a given year) to be
uncorrelated with site hazard. This allows me to re-write the expectation term in
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utility as E
(
eHj | sit
)×Pr(cleanjt = 0 | sit), so that the contamination will be scaled
by the probability that brownfield sites in tract j will remain undeveloped. Lastly,
in anticipation of needing to account for endogeneity issues related to unobserved
neighborhood quality for estimation later on, I collapse all neighborhood- and time-
specific variables in the flow utility into a mean utility term, θjt,
uijt(sit) + ijt = θjt + 1[dit 6= J + 1]
(
βMC ·MCit
+ βPMC · 1[rj 6= rdit−1 ] + βddist(j, dit−1)
)
+ ijt
where θjt =βXXjt + βRRjt + βcE[e
Hjt | sit]× Pr(cleanjt = 0 | sjt) + ξjt (2.5)
2.4.4 The Household’s Problem
The components of the flow utility make up the state of the world that is observable
to a household at the time it makes its decision. I summarize the variables other
than the idiosyncratic error in sit,
sit = [Xt, Rt, E(Ht), V (Ht),MCit, Zt, ξt] (2.6)
Given the above preferences, the household’s problem is to choose a sequence of
neighborhood locations (dit) to maximize its expected sum of discounted flow utilities,
max
dit∈{1,...,J+1}
E
[
T∑
t′=t
βt
′−tu(sit′ , dit′) + it′ | it, sit, dit
]
(2.7)
where β represents the discount rate for future consumption, and the expectation is
taken over the idiosyncratic shocks as well as the transition of the state variables.11
Before proceeding, I make the following assumptions. (i) The idiosyncratic error
terms are additively separable in the flow utility, which is already assumed given the
setup of the flow utility. (ii) The idiosyncratic error terms are i.i.d. over households,
alternatives, and time. (iii) The state variables, sit, follow a Markov process, implying
11The discount factor is assumed to be 0.952 since the decision period is 2 years.
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that the outcome at t + 1 only depends on information at time t. (iv) Conditional
on the choice and state, the idiosyncratic error term does not affect the expected
outcome of the state next period. That is, writing the conditional pdf of sit+1 as
q(sit+1 | sit, dit, it), this conditional independence assumption implies that
q(sit+1 | sit, dit, it) = q(sit+1 | sit, dit)
Given these assumptions, I can write the household’s problem recursively using a
Bellman equation,
Vt (sit, it) = max
dit
{vt(sit, dit) + it} (2.8)
where
vt(sit, dit) ≡ u(sit, dit) (2.9)
+ β
∫ ∑
sit+1
Vt+1 (sit+1, it+1) q(sit+1 | sit, dit)dF (it+1)
Here, I have defined a choice-specific value function, vt(sit, dit), to be the value of
choosing any neighborhood, dit, plus the value from choosing optimally thereon af-
ter.12 Equation 2.9 shows that since moving is costly and neighborhoods can poten-
tially change, a household’s location decision today can affect the values of the choices
it faces in future periods. Furthermore, since there is uncertainty about how neigh-
borhoods will transition, they can only guess at the future states and the associated
utilities in expectation. For simplicity of notation, I will start writing vt(sit, dit), the
choice-specific value function for choosing dit at time t, as vj(sit) (where the choice
dit = j).
12That is, the value function at t+ 1 is
Vt+1(sit+1, it+1) = max{vt+1(sit+1, dit+1 = 1) + i1,t+1, · · · , vt+1(sit+1, dit+1 = J + 1) + iJ+1,t+1}
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Next, I follow much of the dynamic discrete choice literature in assuming that
the choice-specific error, it, is distributed Type I Extreme Value. This gives the
following closed-form solution for the probability of choosing an alternative j,
Pj(sit) =
evj(sit)∑J+1
`=1 e
v`(sit)
(2.10)
Then, taking the distribution assumption on the error term together with Conditional
Independence, the integrated value function also has a closed form (Rust (1987)),
expressed as,
∫
Vt+1(sit+1, it+1)dF (it+1) = log
(
J+1∑
`=1
ev`(sit+1)
)
+ γ (2.11)
where γ denotes Euler’s constant. The choice-specific value function can then be
simplified as
vj (sit) = uj (sit) + βE
[
log
(
J+1∑
`=1
ev`(sit+1)
)
| sit, dit = j
]
+ βγ (2.12)
Conditional Choice Probabilities and Finite Dependence
I next follow Bishop (2012) in using the insights of Hotz and Miller (1993) and
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) to re-write the difference in the choice-specific value
functions in 2.12 as a function of flow utilities and Conditional Choice Probabilities
(CCPs), which yields my main estimating equation.
First, using Hotz and Miller (1993), the integrated value function in 2.11 can
be mapped to functions of choice probabilities. In particular, I write the future
value component of the value function using an arbitrary choice, k, and simplify the
choice-specific value function in 2.12 as
vj (sit) = uj (sit) + β
∑
sit+1
(
vk(sit+1)− logPk(sit+1)
)
· q(sit+1 | sit, dit = j) (2.13)
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Next, given the setup of preferences, I employ finite dependence from Arcidiacono
and Miller (2011) to limit the dependence of future states on previous choices. Along
with the property of utilities that only differences matter, finite dependence allows
me to remove the vk(sit+1) term on the RHS of 2.13, further simplifying household
value functions. To be more specific, preferences are set up to have limited memory
such that the utility a household derives from a choice at t + 1 depends on where
it is located at time t, but not where it is located before that. Since distance of a
move is a state variable, a household’s choice of where to live at t determines the
moving distances to each of the other alternatives in its choice set at time t + 1. In
this way, the household’s choice at t changes the state it faces at t + 1. The choice
at t, however, does not affect the state faced at t + 2. This is since the distance
between wherever a household chooses to locate at t+1 and locations chosen at t+2
will remain the same regardless of where it chose to live at t.13 Now, consider two
sequences of potential choices between t and t + 2 for a household: {j, k,m} and
{g, k,m}. Under finite dependence, the expected value of choosing neighborhood m
at t + 2 conditional on choosing k at t + 1 and j at t, is the same as choosing the
same sequence of alternatives except with g as the first choice,∑
sit+1
∑
sit+2
vm (sit+2) q (sit+2 | sit+1, dit+1 = k) q (sit+1 | sit, dit = j) (2.14)
=
∑
sit+1
∑
sit+2
vm (sit+2) q (sit+2 | sit+1, dit+1 = k)q (sit+1 | sit, dit = g)
Exploiting the fact that only differences in utility matter in a logit framework, that
is,
Pj(sit) =
evj(sit)−vg(sit)
1 +
∑
`6=g e
v`(sit)−vg(sit)
13Household preferences rule out any form of ‘experience’ individuals may have accumulated in
a particular place from the past, which makes using finite dependence possible in this case. Wealth
accumulation would be problematic for using finite dependence. For a dynamic model that uses
CCPs that includes wealth accumulation, see Bayer et al. (2011a)
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and expanding vk(sit+1) in (14) with respect to choice m at t+2 (and similarly repeat-
ing this process for vg(sit)), I can rewrite the probability of choosing an alternative
as a function of flow utilities, 1-period-ahead choice probabilities, and transition
probabilities alone, where the difference in choice-specific value functions is given by
vj (sit)− vg (sit) = uj (sit)− ug (sit) (2.15)
+ β
∑
sit+1
(
uk(sit+1)− logPk(sit+1)
)
q(sit+1 | sit, dit = j)
− β
∑
sit+1
(
uk(sit+1)− logPk(sit+1)
)
q(sit+1 | sit, dit = g)
Since the value functions for choices j and g are expanded with respect to the same
choice, k, at t+ 1, the neighborhood attributes in the one-period ahead flow utilities
cancel, and so the value function difference simplifies to
vj (sit)− vg (sit) = uj (sit)− ug (sit)
+ β
(
βd
(
dist(k, j)− dist(k, g)
)
+ βPMC
(
1[rj 6= rk]− 1[rg 6= rk]
)
+ βMC
(
1[j 6= J + 1] ·MCj,t+1 − 1[g 6= J + 1] ·MCg,t+1
))
+ β
∑
si,t+1
− logPk(si,t+1)q(si,t+1 | sit, dit = j)
−
∑
si,t+1
− logPk(sit+1)q(sit+1 | sit, dit = g)

The probabilities based on these value function differences can then be used to build
the likelihood of household choices from which we recover the utility parameters.
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2.5 Data, Summary Statistics, and Evidence of Learning
There are a total of 1361 census tracts in Massachusetts as defined in the 2000 Cen-
sus. These census tract boundaries coincide with town/city boundaries, which will
overlap with public school district boundaries for most towns. As previously noted,
a neighborhood is defined at the tract level, and belongs to a town (which I will refer
to as a district from hereon after). Since brownfield sites are fairly local disamenities,
the use of tracts as neighborhoods aims to ensure that brownfields are capitalized
into all houses in that neighborhood. With the use of a larger neighborhood defini-
tion, I may encounter an issue where a household chooses a neighborhood containing
a brownfield, but the brownfield is located far away, thus making it difficult to mea-
sure the household’s preferences for brownfields from its residential choices. I attach
attributes (brownfields, crime, schooling, etc.) to each tract to describe the neigh-
borhood using Graphical Information Systems (GIS) software (See Figure 4 for a
map of brownfields to census tracts).
2.5.1 Brownfield Summary Statistics
For the 65 brownfield sites in my sample, a total of 223 assessments were performed
between 1984 to 2012. Figure 5 gives the number of assessments performed over
time. Each site had between 1 and 5 assessments, where the average and median
number of assessments were around 3 for each site (Table 2.1).14 Although the
magnitudes of contamination are small on average compared to the level, we can
reject the hypothesis that the average change in brownfield contamination is equal
to 0 against the alternative that it is greater than 0, which suggests that sites were
found to be slightly worse with each assessment (∆cjt = cjt − cjt−1 > 0). However,
there were instances when contamination was reported to improve (∆cjt < 0), or not
14Only 1 site had 1 assessment.
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change at all (∆cjt = 0). Although I have assumed that true contamination does not
vary over time, this is not contradictory to that assumption, as it is possible that
technological increases have allowed for more comprehensive testing over time.
For sites with more than one assessment, the average time interval between the
first and last assessment was 4.5 years, with a standard deviation of 3.76 years.
Figure 6 plots the assessment intervals for all sites. The model from the previous
section takes the arrival of these assessments as being exogenous. Given the range
in assessment interval, and the variation in the number of assessments performed
across sites, it seems reasonable to believe that households do not form expectations
for the arrival of assessments (i.e. they are a surprise). From surveying assessment
reports, most site investigations are initiated due to a report being filed with the
MA-DEP that noticed a change in the site (e.g. foul odor, leaks). A concern might
arise if sites in wealthier neighborhoods are assessed more often because the resi-
dents in these neighborhoods are more likely to report. To check for this possibility,
I construct two measures of assessment frequency, the number of assessments per
year and the number of years since the last assessment, and regress these measures
on attributes of the neighborhood in which sites are located (Table 12). Although
parameters on these attributes are statistically significant, the magnitudes of these
parameters and of the average changes in the independent variables seem to imply
that they are not economically significant. Although not a definitive test for ex-
ogeneity, this alleviates some concerns that related unobserved variables might be
driving the arrival of information.
In terms of site type, the majority fall into the categories of either Manufacturing
(e.g. paper, clothing, boilers), Other Services (e.g. auto repair, parking), or Trade,
Transport, and Utilities (e.g. warehouses, storage facilities, gas stations) as shown
in Table 2. The largest contaminant category was petroleum products, followed
by contamination from Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), Polycyclic Aromatic
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Hydrocarbons (PAHs), and metals (Table 3). Many of these contaminants are a
result of the chemicals used in the process of manufacturing products for businesses
that previously occupied the site.
2.5.2 Other Neighborhood Amenities
Neighborhood rental prices are imputed from median neighborhood transaction val-
ues according to Himmelberg et al. (2005) and Poterba et al. (1991).15
Data describing exposure to crime are taken from the FBI Uniform Crime Re-
ports. This gives the number of violent crimes as reported by police agencies (cor-
responding to towns/cities) in Massachusetts. To get crime in per capita terms, I
divide by the population for each district over time. The crime data is only avail-
able at the town/city level up through 2011. As a measure of school quality, I use
the percentage of grade 10 students in each school district that achieved a score of
Advanced or Proficient in math on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment
System (MCAS) test. For a measure of poverty, I use the percentage of students in
each district that come from low income households. Both measures are available
at the school district level from 1998 to 2011 from the Massachusetts Department of
Education website.
Massachusetts district level attributes used to predict the probability of cleanup
15Annual cost of ownership is calculated as
Rjt = Pjt ·
[
rrisk freet + r
property
t − τ inct
(
rmortgaget + r
property
t
)
+ δt − gcap gaint+1 + γt
]
The risk free interest rate, rrisk freet , is the rate on the 3-month U.S. treasury bond. The property tax
rate, rpropertyt , is given annually by city/town, and the state income tax, τ
inc
t , is given annually. Both
are taken from the Massachusetts Department of Revenue website. The mortgage rate, rmortgaget ,
is taken from FHFA annual mortgage rates for single-family homes in the Boston MSA. Expected
capital gains, gt+1, are taken to be the sum of expected inflation and real appreciation in housing
price. Expected inflation is taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) maintained
by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, which gives quarterly inflation forecasts. Expected real
appreciation in housing prices is taken to be the spread between long- and short- run interest rates.
The long-run interest rate forecast used is the rate on the 10-year U.S. treasury bond is taken from
the Livingston Survey. Depreciation is assumed to be 2.5%, and the risk premium for owning versus
renting is assumed to be 2% (Flavin and Yamashita (2002)).
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are more generally taken from www.mass.gov, the official website for the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. These include district-level indicators that vary over time
such as unemployment, budgeting, and population. Race variables are taken from
the 2000 Census. Summary statistics are provided in panel A and B of Table 4.
2.5.3 Housing Data
The real estate data are from Dataquick Information Services. The time frame I
consider is 1998 through 2011 for the state of Massachusetts. The data contain
the exact location and characteristics of the universe of housing transactions. For
each house in the data set, which is tracked by a unique property identifier, house
attributes, such as square footage, age, and the number of bedrooms and bathrooms,
are recorded from the most recent tax assessment. Information about the history of
transactions for each property includes the transaction price and date, the names of
the buyers and sellers, as well as information about the buyer’s mortgage loan.
Although Dataquick provides unique property identifiers, it does not provide
identifiers for the households that move into and out of the properties. Using buyer
and seller names, and the transaction dates, I obtain information on a household’s
last location decision. I accomplish this by following a name-matching algorithm
used in Bayer et al. (2011a). The algorithm takes the first and last name of a buyer,
and looks for a seller with the same first and last name within a window of a year
of the transaction. Upon matching where a buying household came from, I check
to see whether the specific house sells again based on the unique property identifier.
If it does, then I infer that this household chose to stay in their current location
at each period up until the date the house transacted again, though I do not track
where it then moves afterwards. In the resulting data set, for each move decision
(an observed sale transaction), I know where the household is moving from, and for
each stay decision, I know where it is choosing to stay.
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The analysis limits transaction types to arms length transactions and properties
that are owner-occupied. Since only housing characteristics from the most recent
assessment are recorded, houses indicated to have undergone a major improvement
after the beginning of my sample time frame are dropped, as attributes would be
incorrect for previous transactions otherwise. Houses that sold more than once per
year or four times per the window of house sales (14 years) are excluded. Prices are
normalized to January 2000 dollars using the monthly All Urban Consumer Price
Index for Housing in the U.S. Northeast Region available from the Index (2012). The
analysis then excludes the 1st and 99th percentile of the observed price distribution.
After cleaning the housing data, I observe sales in 1300 tracts across 14 years
between 1998 and 2011. Of 953,509 transactions after cleaning the data, I identified
previous locations for 158,319 transactions (approximately 17%). This is a clear
drawback of using a name matching algorithm, as I will not be able to track renters
who become homeowners, those who move from outside of Massachusetts, and those
who change names. There is also a concern that prior locations for buyers with more
common names could be mismatched. These are problems suffered by all analyses
of housing market dynamics, and highlight the need for collection of better data
on residential mobility of homeowners. The final sample includes 158,319 choices
to move, and 520,251 choices to stay. Panel C of Table 4 summarizes the house
attributes for these transactions.
2.5.4 Evidence from the Data
The learning parameters are identified by the way prices respond to information sig-
nals. Thus, before proceeding to estimation, it is worthwhile to discuss identification
and look for evidence of learning in the new data. Assuming that households are
Bayesian learners implies that they learn about the unobserved brownfield hazard
in a very specific way (i.e. using recursive Bayesian updating formulas), and that
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this way of learning is optimal given the distributional assumptions on the noise and
prior beliefs. The means of posterior beliefs on hazard are determined by whether
prices after information is released are, on average, different compared to those before
signals are released. I allow the prior mean to be determined in a similar manner.
Most papers that use Bayesian learners assume, taken to my context, that the prior
mean for brownfield hazards should be the average over all posterior means. That
is, on average, agents are rational and have correct beliefs. The learning setup in
my paper departs from this assumption because if households are on average cor-
rect, then learning should not matter in the average MTWP estimate. Assuming
informed contamination priors restricts how much could be learned about brownfield
hazard.16 The variance in signal and prior noise is identified based on the number of
information signals it takes for prices to become stable (i.e. when signals stop impart-
ing information). The parameters on IE settings are determined by how perceived
information signals affect household beliefs about hazard.17
To see whether learning is translated to the data, I first look at the average impact
of the first assessment for each site. Figure 7 gives a nonparameteric plot of housing
price residuals against the days relative to the first assessment, where the vertical
line denotes the day when the first assessment is performed (prices are adjusted for
house and neighborhood attributes as well as year and district fixed effects). In an
attempt to isolate the effect of that assessment, I limit the observations to a window
of 2 years before and after the initial assessment date. There is a discrete (and
statistically significant) downward jump in equilibrium prices at the first assessment
date. If I restrict my model by assuming homebuyers have high priors relative to
16In fact, when estimating my model, which will be discussed in the next section, with a prior
mean set to be the average of the posterior means, the difference in the estimates with and without
learning disappears.
17If households know that more institutions nearby implies the standards for a contamination
designation are lower, then households should interpret the signal for hazard to be relatively low
given high IE settings compared to a place with the same signal and low IE settings.
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the first assessment (i.e. they initially believe these areas to be fairly contaminated),
then my model would not be able to explain this fall in prices after initial assessments
are released. I repeat the exercise in Figure 7 with regressions in Table 13 (Figure 7
would correspond to the regression in the first column - ‘First Assmt’). The estimates
imply that on average, controlling for house attributes, neighborhood characteristics,
and year and district fixed effects, assessments are imparting new information to the
market. Other than the last assessment before cleanup, prices fall, on average, after
assessments are released. Consequently, the changes in prices after each assessment
suggest that learning occurs over the course of information releases.
2.6 Estimation
Estimation will proceed in four stages. First, given a guess of the prior mean, H0,
I estimate the other learning parameters from the contamination signal equation
to form beliefs about brownfield hazards. I also estimate parameters that determine
cleanup in this step. Second, I estimate the household’s dynamic neighborhood choice
problem to recover the moving cost parameters and a mean utility for living in each
neighborhood at each time period. In the third stage, I decompose the mean utility
estimates with respect to neighborhood attributes, including the hazard beliefs. In
the final stage, I perform a grid search on the prior mean, repeating steps 1 and 3 for
each guess of the prior, and retain the learning and the utility parameters associated
with the highest likelihood from the mean utility decomposition.
Estimating the problem in this order boils down to the following assumptions.
First, whether a site is cleaned does not depend on where people choose to live. Sec-
ond, households only learn about brownfield hazards through the released contami-
nation signals. Finally, cleanup only depends on hazard through the contamination
signals. To see how, we observe from the data whether a person moves, and the
conditions in the place they choose. The contribution to the conditional likelihood
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for household i at t given the state variables, sit, is characterized by the joint pdf of
the observed location decision and the contamination results for all neighborhoods
up to time t. Writing the joint density as the conditional times the marginal, the
likelihood can be split as done in the following
`(dit, c1 . . . ct, cleanjt | sit, H) (2.16)
= `(cleanjt | dit, ct, sit, H)× `(dit | {ck}tk=1 , sit, H)× `({ck}tk=1 | sit, H)
Assuming that household choices do not affect cleanup, cleanup’s dependence on
household choices can be removed. The likelihood can also be re-written to depend
on the hazard using the law of total probability,
= `(cleanjt | ct, sit, H)× `(dit | {ck}tk=1 , sit, H)× `({ck}tk=1 | sit, H) (2.17)
=
∫
H
`(cleanjt | ct, sit, H)`(dit | {ck}tk=1 , sit, H)× `({ck}tk=1 | sit, H)dF (H)
Next, as James (2011) noticed in a different context of occupational ability learning
using wages and academic grades as signals, if we assume that household choices and
site cleanup only depend on hazards through the observed sequence of contamination
outcomes, then conditioning on the hazard in addition to the contamination results
provides no additional information for observing household choices or whether a site
will be cleaned. In other words, the contribution to the likelihood can be written
=
∫
H
`(cleanjt | ct, sit)× `(dit | {ck}tk=1 , sit)× `({ck}tk=1 | sit, H)dF (H) (2.18)
= `(cleanjt | ct, sit)× `(dit | {ck}tk=1 , sit)×
∫
H
`({ck}tk=1 | sit, H)dF (H)
Rewriting the likelihood in this way suggests that estimation of the hazard beliefs
and the utility parameters that generate household choices can proceed sequentially.
Specifically, I can solve the household’s discrete choice problem to recover utility
parameters, taking the estimated hazard beliefs as a state variable. Furthermore,
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recall that (1) hazard beliefs are formed at the level of the neighborhood, and (2) I
have collapsed all neighborhood- and time- level variables into a mean utility term
for the discrete choice estimation. In this case, if the neighborhood state variables
can be summarized by the mean utility terms and households forecast the transitions
of these mean utilities to determine their choice-specific future values (rather than
forecast each component of the state separately), then I do not need hazard belief
estimates until after I have recovered these mean utilities. This implies that I can
circumvent re-estimating the discrete choice problem to evaluate another guess for
the prior mean, since the prior (and hazard beliefs) would only affect how the mean
utilities decompose into different neighborhood attributes. In the following sections,
I outline each stage of the estimation in detail. In the final part of this section, I
also discuss a measure of the value of information that can be constructed with the
estimated parameters.
2.6.1 Stage 1: Posterior Beliefs
In the first stage, I estimate the linear model of contamination results in equation
2.4.1 on site hazard and IE surroundings given a guess of the prior mean (H0). The
goal of this stage is to recover and use the parameters of the contamination model
to characterize household beliefs from different exposures to site information at each
point in time. Although a site’s IE surroundings are observed data, I do not have
data on true site hazard as it is unobserved. To deal with this, I follow James
(2011) in using an Expectation and Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al.
(1977)). The EM algorithm provides a way to estimate the learning parameters,
based on unobserved data (H). Recall that contamination signals for a brownfield k
in neighborhood j are given by
sigkt = c˜kt − λ · IEk = Hk + ekt
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where ekt is distributed N (0, σe). If a site has never experienced any signals, the ini-
tial prior on the hazard level is distributed N (H0, δ). Thus, the learning parameters
we want to estimate, excluding the prior mean, are
[λ, σe, δ]
The EM Algorithm is an iterative procedure that estimates these parameters by
imputing the unobserved data given a parameter guess, and then using the data
to build the likelihood function that is then maximized to recover a new guess of
parameters. I describe the two steps in detail in the Appendix. For neighborhoods
that do not contain brownfields, I assume the belief is that there is no contamination
with certainty.
2.6.2 Stage 2: Dynamic Discrete Choice
Stage 2 recovers the moving cost parameters (βd, βMC , βPSY ), and the mean utilities,
θjt, for each neighborhood at every time period using household location decisions,
leaving the parameters on specific neighborhood attributes to be estimated in a later
stage.
Recall the value function difference, vj (sit)−vg (sit) derived in the model section.
The future value component of this difference can be approximated by one-period
ahead flow utilities and Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCP) of some alternative
k at t+ 1,
β ·
(
uk(sit+1)−E [logPk(si,t+1) | sit, dit = j]
)
− β ·
(
uk(sit+1)− E [logPk(si,t+1) | sit, dit = g]
)
It follows that to build the likelihood, we need to first forecast values of the state
variables at t+1 based on the state at t, and then predict the one-period ahead CCP’s
based on the forecasted state next period. Since I have collapsed all neighborhood-
time level terms into θjt, I will forecast θjt+1 rather than predict state variables at
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t + 1 individually. To do this, I first estimate moving cost parameters and mean
utilities using a reduced-form multinomial logit.18 Assuming that households believe
the mean utilities follow an AR(1) process, I then pool the estimated θjt’s across
neighborhood and time, and regress the current value of the mean utility on its
previous value and dummy variables for each time period. I then combine draws
from the residual distribution estimated from the AR(1) process with the current
values of θjt to predict potential values in the next period.
19 Given the reduced-form
logit parameters and the draws of the state at t + 1, I can form the probability for
choosing alternative k for each draw of the predicted mean utility. Averaging over
the calculated probabilities from each draw then gives the CCP for choice k in period
t+ 1.
Once I have recovered approximations of the future value component of household
value functions, I can use them to build and maximize the following likelihood,
` (βd, βMC , βPSY , θ) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
J+1∑
j=1
1[dit = j] · log
(
exp (vj(sit)− vg(sit))
1 +
∑
m6=j exp (vm(sit)− vg(sit))
)
Since the value function is linear in the remaining utility parameters, this is simply
a multinomial logit with an adjustment term for forward looking behavior, where
the mean utilities are recovered using a Berry (1994) contraction mapping at each
iteration of calculating the likelihood.
2.6.3 Stage 3: Preferences for Neighborhood Attributes
In the third stage, I recover preferences for neighborhood level attributes by decom-
posing the estimated mean utilities in equation 2.5. Concern for estimating that
18This is done using a Berry (1994) contraction mapping, where the mean utilities within each
time period are normalized with respect to one choice. In practice, to speed up estimation, I
estimate a 3-level nested logit and constrain the nesting parameters to be 1 at each level. The
nesting of the decision process starts with the choice to move or stay, followed by the choice of
district given the choice to move, and then the choice of tract conditional on the choice of district.
Parameters for the nested logit are given in Table 14 of the Appendix.
19In practice, I take 25 draws from the residual distribution.
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equation directly arises because of the endogeneity of price, as the costs of living in
a neighborhood may be correlated with unobserved factors about the neighborhood.
Assuming that the marginal utility of a dollar in moving costs is the same as that for
housing costs, I can use the moving cost parameter estimated from the discrete choice
step to directly control for the effect of housing costs on mean utility, θ̂jt− β̂MCRjt. I
then regress these adjusted mean utilities on neighborhood attributes to recover the
MWTP, and control other neighborhood unobservables with year and district fixed
effects.
2.6.4 Stage 4: Estimate the Prior Mean
In the final stage, I revise the guess of the prior mean, re-estimate the learning
parameters (stage 1) based on the revised prior, and get MWTP estimates (stage
3) based on this updated guess. Guesses are made along a grid from -6 to 6 at an
interval of 0.05. The likelihood from the mean utility decomposition will be used as
the criteria for choosing the prior mean estimate.
2.6.5 Value of Information
In the process of better estimating household MWTP for site remediation under
learning, we can see whether households’ decisions are impacted by what they learn.
If learning does in fact occur, then it would suggest that assessments are a valuable
tool for more informed decision-making. Once the utility parameters are recovered,
we can calculate the value of the information provided by the site assessments. The
DeGroot (1970) measure of the value of information for a person i at time t is defined
as the difference in the utility achieved from the optimal choices under pre- and post-
information sets,
V Iit =
∑
i
[Vi (τ1, dit(τ1))− Vi (τ1, dit(τ0))]
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where τt is information at time t, and di(τt) is the optimal choice under the infor-
mation set at time t for household i. Since in this setting, information is continually
released over time, I set the ‘post’ information set to be the state of information
resulting from the assessments that actually occurred (τ1), and the ‘pre’ information
set to be that if the last assessment for a particular site before cleanup was never
performed (τ0). Intuitively, V
I
it is the difference between the utility from what a
person actually chose and the utility achieved from making a sub-optimal decision
that would have been optimal under the state of knowledge associated with one less
assessment being performed for that site, e.g. the value of the marginal assessment.
2.7 Results
I estimate the prior mean on hazard, H0, to be −1.4 (Figure 8 plots the log-likelihood
of the grid search). Compared to an average for the most updated posterior mean of
ET (Hk) = −0.48, household initial beliefs about hazard were, on average, 1 standard
deviation lower than what was revealed later on. Stage 1 results for the learning
parameters are given in Table 5. These parameters are used to build the posterior
distributions on hazard for each neighborhood at each time period. As an example,
I plot the belief distribution for one of the brownfield sites in Figure 9. As expected
in Bayesian updating, the mean of the posterior beliefs fluctuates in the direction of
the contamination signal, and the uncertainty over the hazard distribution is reduced
with each signal that is received.
Stage 2 consists of first estimating the Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs)
to get the future value portion of each household’s value function, followed by using
the CCPs in the estimation of the household’s dynamic discrete choice problem.
Using the CCP estimates, Table 6 gives the discrete choice estimates for various
parameters associated with moving costs, which are the remaining parameters not
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absorbed into the neighborhood-time mean utility term.20 I find physical moving
costs to be $105.24 per kilometer. Given that the average distance of moves is 48.82
kilometers, this implies an average physical moving cost of $5,137.90.21 I include
estimates for the myopic case, where the future utility portion of the value function
is set to 0 (in other words, the discount factor, β, is 0).
With the estimates of neighborhood mean utilities, stage 3 decomposes the tract-
time mean utilities to recover MWTP for the hazard, as well as other attributes. In
order to evaluate the effect of modeling learning and forward-looking behavior on
MWTP estimates, it is useful to compare the estimates for the model outlined from
the previous sections with an estimate that either (i) assumes myopic households,
(ii) assumes full information about brownfield hazards so that learning is not needed,
or (iii) does both (i) and (ii). As previously mentioned, adding dynamics in my con-
text implies allowing households to be forward-looking with respect to time-varying
amenities (β 6= 0), and also allowing households to forecast the cleanup likelihood of
nearby brownfields in the future.22 Modeling households as static utility maximizers
when they are forward-looking may lead one to observe higher levels of housing val-
ues with, for example, high levels of crime. From this, we would conclude that people
care little for crime, when, in reality, they are simply willing to pay higher prices
today because they expect this disamenity will improve in the future. Assuming full
information on contamination, which I will refer to as the ‘no learning’ case, means
that we assume households are fully informed about each site’s contaminants even
20Table 14 provides the estimates used to construct the CCPs.
21For a 3.4 bedroom apartment, the mean in my sample, Bieri et al. (2012) would predict physical
moving costs to be between $2,500 and $3,500. The moving cost estimates in Bieri et al. (2012) are
based on converting average bedroom size to a weight in pounds that an average household would
have to transport for a move, and then calculating the cost of transport for varying travel distances
at various weight groups. Although my estimate is larger than what they predict, their estimate
is for renters whereas my estimates are based on a sample of homeowners, whom may presumably
have larger physical moving costs.
22Table 15 gives estimates for the probability of cleanup.
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when they may actually be uninformed. This raises a concern that we might then
observe high levels of housing values associated with high levels of contamination
simply because households do not know the contamination exists, which can then
lead to a downward bias in the measured MWTP. I can use my model to recover
an estimate of the MWTP assuming no learning by simply altering the contami-
nation exposure for all households to be the contamination reported from the last
assessment for each brownfield (before it is remediated). This will replicate the in-
formation structure in the standard hedonic framework. Modeling learning can then
be thought of as adjusting the contamination levels to reflect households beliefs at a
given point in time.
Table 7 presents the raw estimates from the mean utility decomposition for each of
the four cases. Panels A and B respectively give the estimates assuming myopic and
forward-looking households. Within each panel for both the learning and no learning
cases, utility decompositions are shown with and without year and school district
fixed effects. Standard errors that adjust for the estimation error in this multi-
stage estimation procedure will be bootstrapped, however, first stage standard errors
are temporarily provided for reference. Focusing on the columns that include fixed
effects, parameter signs are as expected for hazard, per capita crime, % low income,
and average house attributes. Although the school quality measure, which is the % of
students with an Advanced or Proficient MCAS score, shows the opposite sign from
what one would expect, the variable is insignificant even with first stage standard
errors. This result is likely to occur with school district fixed effects when the areas
with high levels of school quality are always the same districts. The inclusion of these
neighborhood attributes mainly serve as controls that proxy for other unobserved
characteristics about neighborhoods that might drive sorting behavior beyond what
fixed effects can control. Although signs are generally sensible, caution must be
exercised in interpreting the magnitudes as they may be biased by correlations with
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unobservables.
Table 8 converts the estimates (with fixed effects) into dollar values using the
financial moving cost parameter. Comparing across columns, Panel A of Table 8
shows that the MWTP to avoid a rise in a unit of contamination in the myopic
and forward-looking cases are about the same when learning is modeled ($891.23
compared to $888.38). This difference is slightly larger without learning ($363.81
compared to $416.52, although the confidence intervals, based on OLS standard
errors, overlap). The overall similarity between the myopic and forward-looking
estimates suggests that households are not anticipating sites to be cleaned upon
receiving contamination signals. Furthermore, the bias in not allowing for learning is
alleviated when forward-looking behavior is allowed, as evident from a larger MWTP
estimate when dynamics are included. However, the interpretation of the source of
this bias is quite different. If one only examines the estimates without learning, they
may incorrectly attribute bias to households being forward-looking as opposed to
having incomplete information neighborhood attributes.
In terms of learning versus full information (comparing across rows in Table 8,
Panel A), the MWTP with learning in the dynamic case is more than double the
estimate without learning, rising from $416.52 per unit of contamination, to $888.38.
The bias is even larger when forward-looking behavior is removed from the models.
This implies that households are slowly learning about contamination over time, and
in particular, find that contamination is worse than what they had originally thought.
Thus, when we take data on housing values to infer MWTP and assume households
are informed about site hazards, we are falsely attributing high housing values to
households not caring (enough) about brownfields when in fact the households are
just uninformed about the extent of the contamination.
It is also useful to compare these estimates to the simple hedonic model. Table
9 gives results from a hedonic regression of rental price regressed on contamination
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levels, where the contamination is assumed to be from the last recorded assessment
before cleanup. For consistency, I include the same set of controls used in the mean
utility decomposition. The hedonic model estimates a MWTP of $373.30 to reduce a
unit of contamination, which is consistent with the static estimate without learning
in my model ($363.81).23 Given that the two models seem comparable, I compare the
hedonic regression estimate to the estimate that accounts for learning and forward-
looking behavior and find that the MWTP estimate in my model is 2.38 times the
simple hedonic estimate.
As brownfield sites are fairly diverse, one might expect willingness to pay to vary
depending on what sites will be converted to after cleanup. Table 10 additionally
adds contamination interacted with dummy variables for future use in the forward-
looking model with learning. The set of variables with which I interact contamination
include (1) a dummy for whether future use is known, (2) a dummy for if a site will
be used for green space, and (3) a dummy for if a site will be used for parking. The
base group to interpret the interaction terms would be the group for which future use
has yet to be determined. I find that if future use is unknown, MWTP for a unit of
contamination is only $162.01, compared to $812.61 (=$162.01 + $650.59) if future
use is known. Furthermore, if the site is used for green space, the MWTP increases
to $1,023.08 (=$162.01 + $650.59 + $210.47). Site conversion to a parking lot adds
$107.30 to MWTP for contamination at a site with known future use, although this
is statistically insignificant under first stage standard errors.
Finally, using the parameter estimates, I can calculate the DeGroot measure of
the value of information, which gives the average utility loss in dollar terms of re-
moving one assessment. I calculate this for every site in my sample and present an
average. Since a change for a particular site will most directly impact households in
23Since the simple hedonic estimate does not include moving costs, the model for the myopic/no
learning case is still slightly different from the model that produces the hedonic estimate. Thus, we
should still expect some differences in the estimates.
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the tracts near the site, I calculate this for the sample of households who actually
chose neighborhoods that are within 3km of sites. The average of the loss in lifetime
utility per household is $17,887.38, or a flow value of $894.37 (Table 11, Panel A).
I separately calculate the value of information for sites by previous use, categorized
by the NAICS codes (Table 11, Panel B). The value of information ranges from
$14,089.69 to $23,307.93, with the lowest value belonging to recycling and waste
facilities (categorized as Professional and Business Services), and the highest belong-
ing to those used for financial activities (office space). I additionally calculate the
information value for some specific types of sites (Table 11, Panel C). The value
of information from an assessment of a former gas station ($16,240.80) is relatively
small compared to that from an assessment of a former factory ($19,209.43) or a
school, park, or office building ($22,771.54 ). This ranking is intuitive as there is
more value in revealing contamination for locations that household do not expect to
be polluted.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper builds learning and expectations into the traditional hedonic framework
as a way of improving upon existing methods to value environmental amenities.
Specifically, the aim is to correct an information-related bias to the MWTP esti-
mate, which, in the context of brownfield cleanup policy, translates into a faulty
assumption that households have full information about a site’s contamination lev-
els. To identify whether this bias exists and, if so, its direction and magnitude, I
collect data from assessments on brownfield contamination over time for 65 sites in
Massachusetts. The published assessments are assumed to convey information about
brownfield hazards to households. In addition, since dynamics have been shown by
recent work to be a source of bias to amenity valuation, the information-related bias
cannot be simply recovered by estimating the hedonic gradient while separating out
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the housing values associated with different information sets. Instead, one should
allow for the possibility that the released information may impact household expec-
tations for how a site might evolve in the future. Thus, in order to account for
both learning and forward-looking behavior, I build upon previous dynamic neigh-
borhood choice models by additionally allowing households to learn about brownfield
contamination while making residential location decisions. Valuation estimates re-
covered from such a model allow researchers to adjust for an information bias, while
allowing for forward-looking behavior in the household’s decision problem.
Results suggest that the MWTP for a unit decrease in contamination is $888.38.
This estimate is more than two times higher than the simple hedonic estimate. Al-
though forward-looking behavior have been found in other work to create large biases
for valuing other types of neighborhood amenities such as crime and air quality, I
find no evidence for households anticipating cleanup from contamination signals once
learning about site contamination is allowed. This suggests that as households gain
knowledge about site contaminants, they learn that contamination is generally worse
than what they had previously thought. Therefore, depending on how household
knowledge compares to released information, information that accompanies policies
to improve an amenity can significantly alter the researcher’s measurement of the
MWTP. Furthermore, a breakdown of the MWTP for contamination by future use
suggests that households have a much higher willingness to pay for a site with a
planned future use. This is something policymakers may want to consider when
valuing site cleanup. Since the estimates suggest that households are learning from
the information being released, I calculate the value of the information using the
parameter estimates from my model. I find the average value per capita for one
assessment to be $17,887.38, where this value varies depending on previous site use.
The ranking of the informational value of assessments for different sites is consistent
with the notion that there is more value from information released for areas that are
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least expected to be polluted. In conclusion, these results suggest that the dynamics
of information, and in particular, learning, have non-trivial effects on the MWTP
estimate, and should be accounted for in recovering amenity valuation.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Brownfield Characteristics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Assessments per Site 65 3.43 3 0.98 1 5
NRSIV Score (Institutional)
† 65 26.2 15 25.58 0 155
NRSV Score (Environmental) 65 42.2 20 42.82 0 170
Assessment Year 223 2000.08 2002 6.547315 1984 2012
Assessment Interval (yrs) 158 4.51 3 3.759891 0 18
Contaminant (cjt)
†† 223 2.99 3 2.16 0 10
∆cjt = cjt − cjt−1 158 0.87 1 2.48 -5 7
† NRS Scores IV and V respectively represent measures for the presence institutions and areas of environmental concern.
†† Contaminant (cjt) is the sum of the number of contaminants found in each exposure pathway (soil, groundwater,
sediments, air, surface water, or other)
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Table 2.2: Site Previous Use
Previous Use Categories † Freq. Percent
Construction (G-CON) 3 4.62
Manufacturing (G-MAN) 30 46.15
Natural Resources and Mining (G-NRM) 1 1.54
Educational & Health Services (S-EHS) 3 4.62
Financial Activities (S-FA) 1 1.54
Leisure and Hospitality (S-LH) 2 3.08
Other Services (S-OS)†† 11 16.92
Professional & Business Services (S-PBS) 2 3.08
Trade, Transport, Utilities (S-TTU) 10 15.38
Residential (RES) 2 3.08
† Business categories are divided according to the NAICS sector level index.
†† S-OS include Repair & maintenance, Personal & Laundry Services, Religious,
Grant-making, Civic, Professional organizations, and Private Households
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Table 2.3: Brownfield Contamination
Contaminants
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lead 223 0.40 0.49 0 1
Asbestos 223 0.08 0.27 0 1
VOC 223 0.39 0.49 0 1
PCB 223 0.11 0.32 0 1
PAH 223 0.38 0.49 0 1
Petroleum Products 223 0.52 0.50 0 1
Other Metals 223 0.39 0.49 0 1
Exposure Pathways
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Surface Water 223 0.03 0.16 0 1
Groundwater 223 0.47 0.50 0 1
Soil 223 0.75 0.43 0 1
Other 223 0.12 0.33 0 1
Note: There are a total of 223 signals across 65 brownfield sites.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics
A. Neighborhood Attributes
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min. Max.
District-level (N = 225 Districts × 14 year)
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min. Max.
Crime per capita (in 000’s) 3.60 2.23 4.09 0.00 36.09
MCAS % Adv/Prof 60.81 65.00 22.54 4.00 100.00
% Low Income 18.43 11.80 18.06 0.00 90.80
Tract-level (N = 1300 Tracts × 14 years)
Rent (annual) $34,838 $31,866 $14,506 $6,315 $144,754
B. Brownfield Site District Attributes
(N = 65 Sites × 14 years)
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min. Max.
Per Capita Spending (100’s) 26.12 25.92 6.26 9.68 48.62
% Unemployed 5.68 5.20 2.48 1.50 17.20
1[Proposalyear] 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
% black 0.0522 0.0134 0.1419 0.0003 0.9020
% hispanic 0.0792 0.0256 0.1418 0.0000 0.8337
C. House Attributes
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min. Max.
Transaction Price $298,807 $263,234 $172,525 $22,906 $1,148,206
# of Bedrooms 3.19 3 1.08 1 29
# of Bathrooms 2.10 2 0.82 0.5 32.50
Sq. Feet 1972 1800 923 120 30272
Total Movers Stayers
Households 678,570 158,319 520,251
† Since there can be multiple brownfield sites within each tract, NRS scores, which are assigned at the brownfield level, are
aggregated up to the tract level.
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Table 2.5: Stage 1 Learning Parameter Estimates
Estimate 95 % Conf. Interv.
Prior mean H0 -1.400
Prior noise δ 1.851
Signal noise σe 0.292
NRSIV IEjt 0.033
NRSV IEjt 0.019
Posterior Beliefs† Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
ET (Hk) -0.480 1.236 -5.067 1.006
VT (Hk) 0.089 0.032 0.057 0.252
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
NRSIV Score (Institutional) 26.2 25.58 0 155
NRSV Score (Environmental) 42.2 42.82 0 170
† These refer to the most updated set of beliefs by the last time period, T .
†† Contamination has been reparameterized as c˜kt = log (1 + ckt)
Table 2.6: Stage 2 Discrete Choice Estimates
Myopic Forward-looking
Travel Dist (in $ per km) $24.34 $105.24
Psych MC (in $) $21,589.30 $10,782.57
Financial MC (in $1,000) -0.2367 -0.2419
J × T mean utility estimates Not Shown
Note: Dynamic estimate implies an average physical moving cost of $5,137.90
given an average moving distance of distance: 48.82 km.
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Table 2.7: Tract-Time Mean Utility Decomposition
Panel A: Myopic Households
Dep. Var.: Assume Full Information† Assume Learning
θ̂myopicjt − β̂myopicMC ·Rjt est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
sigjT ∗ 0.001 0.009 -0.086 0.009
E[eHj ] 0.019 0.030 -0.215 0.032
Per capita crime -90.678 13.396 -46.115 18.460 -91.476 13.444 -41.905 18.561
% Low Income -0.062 0.002 -0.016 0.008 -0.062 0.002 -0.012 0.008
MCAS % Adv/Prof 0.026 0.002 -0.005 0.007 0.026 0.002 -0.004 0.007
# of Bedrooms -1.822 0.068 -1.339 0.060 -1.824 0.068 -1.372 0.060
# of Bathrooms 2.953 0.132 2.051 0.121 2.953 0.132 2.054 0.121
Sq. Feet 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001115 0.000
Fixed Effects None District & Year None District & Year
Panel B: Forward-looking Households
Dep. Var.: Assume Full Information Assume Learning
θ̂DDCjt − β̂DDCMC ·Rjt est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
sigjT ∗ × P̂noclean 0.000 0.011 -0.102 0.009
E(eHjt)× P̂noclean -0.099 0.036 -0.217 0.032
Per capita crime -73.212 15.228 -44.306 17.129 -70.104 15.245 -39.187 17.257
% Low Income -0.031 0.003 -0.039 0.008 -0.030 0.003 -0.032 0.008
MCAS % Adv/Prof 0.026 0.002 -0.011 0.006 0.025 0.002 -0.010 0.006
# of Bedrooms -1.996 0.082 -1.254 0.056 -1.986 0.082 -1.300 0.056
# of Bathrooms 3.458 0.156 2.096 0.112 3.450 0.156 2.105 0.112
Sq. Feet 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
Fixed Effects None District & Year None District & Year
† Under the full information assumption, households are assumed to use the contamination reported from the last assessment
for each site before cleanup to make housing choices at all times, as indexed by T ∗ in the variable sig.
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Table 2.8: MWTP Estimates
Panel A: MWTP for Contamination
Decrease in Contamination Myopic Forward-looking
Assume Full Information $363.81 $416.52
($40.09) ($134.17)
Assume Learning $891.23 $888.38
($38.85) ($130.81)
Panel B: MWTP for Other Attributes
Change in Other Attributes Myopic Forward-looking
Decrease in Crime per 1000 people $177.11 $165.61
($78.41) ($71.35)
Decrease Low Income households by 1% point $48.74 $129.09
($35.27) ($34.46)
Decrease in MCAS Adv./Prof. by 1% point $15.51 $41.57
($27.64) ($25.36)
Increase in Bedroom -$5,796.48 -$5,313.99
($252.43) ($231.31)
Increase in Bathroom $8,681.95 $8,605.98
($510.62) ($464.83)
Increase in Sq. Ft. $4.71 $6.71
($0.48) ($0.45)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.9: Simple Hedonic Estimates
Dep. Var.
Rental Price est. s.e.
sigjT ∗ -$373.30 12.901
Crime per 1000 people -$152.38 15,989.81
% Low Income $3.69 6.818
MCAS % Adv/Prof $19.31 3.957
Bed -$370.10 20.017
Bath $4,563.00 31.919
Sqft $10.28 0.03
Constant $14,689.00 368.696
Observations 147,725
R-squared 0.634
Note: Year and district fixed effects included.
Table 2.10: MWTP Estimates by Future Use
Decrease in Contamination Forward-looking, Learning
est. s.e.
Future Use unknown (Base Group) $162.01 $92.12
Future Use known $650.59 $153.90
Future Use: Greenspace $210.47 $113.63
Future Use: Parking $107.30 $133.47
Note: Regression includes 3 additional interaction terms with contamination - (1) interaction with
dummy for if future use is known, (2) interaction with dummy for whether site will be converted for
green space, and (3) interaction with dummy for whether site will be converted for parking.
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Table 2.11: Value of Information
A. Overall
Mean Min Max
Value Per Household $17,887.38 $8,336.56 $29,004.13
(Flow Value) $894.37 $416.83 $1,450.21
# of Tracts within 3km of Sites 20.54 1 76
B. Breakdown by Previous Use†
NAICS Sectors Mean Value Mean Flow Value
Professional and Business Services $14,089.69 $704.48
Natural Resources and Mining $14,111.16 $705.56
Residential $16,636.31 $831.82
Trade, Transportation, and Utilities $16,654.88 $832.74
Other Services $16,809.43 $840.47
Educational and Health Services $17,768.30 $888.42
Manufacturing $18,778.99 $938.95
Construction $19,884.49 $994.22
Leisure and Hospitality $21,929.50 $1,096.48
Financial Activities $23,307.93 $1,165.40
C. By Specific Examples Previous Use
Gas Stations $16,240.80 $812.04
Factories $19,209.43 $960.47
School, Park, Office Building $22,771.54 $1,138.58
Note: The Degroot value of information from removing the last assessment is calculated each of the 65 sites.
The table gives summary statistics for the values.
† Previous use categorized by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
103
Table 2.12: Assessment Endogeneity
Assessments Years since last Var. Change over Time
Dep. Var. per Year Assessment Mean St. Dev.
Per capita spending (in $100) 0.00537*** -0.0155 0.910 1.145
(0.001) (0.028)
% Unemployed 0.00579** 0.0605 0.357 1.104
(0.002) (0.053)
% Low Income 0.000193 -0.0220** 0.900 2.680
(0.000) (0.010)
MCAS % Adv/Prof 0.00117*** -0.0172** 3.901 7.739
(0.000) (0.008)
Per capita crime -2.559 32.68 0.000 0.001
(1.767) (39.317)
Constant -0.176*** 4.379***
(0.025) (0.555)
Obs. 786 786
Dep. Var Mean 0.0547 2.8270
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are calculated for each brownfield
site at each year between 1998 and 2011. All independent variables vary at the school-district and year level.
Table 2.13: Average Price Change at Various Assessment Updates
Dep. Var.
log(Price) First Assmt Assmt 2 Assmt 3 Assmt 4 Assmt 5 Last Assmt
1[After First Assmt] -0.166***
(0.016)
1[After Assmt 2] -0.00481
(0.008)
1[After Assmt 3] -0.0577***
(0.007)
1[After Assmt 4] -0.0175*
(0.010)
1[After Assmt 5] -0.145***
(0.027)
1[After Last Assmt] 0.00687
(0.005)
Constant 10.98*** 11.36*** 11.22*** 11.29*** 12.03*** 11.26***
(0.080) (0.048) (0.048) (0.171) (0.163) (0.077)
Observations 14,651 25,973 35,981 23,260 9,381 57,718
R-squared 0.528 0.535 0.540 0.511 0.566 0.550
Note: Each column represents a regression of log(price) on a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a house sells after the
corresponding assessment. The base group for comparison are houses that sold before the assessment. Observations are
limited to 730 days (approx. 2 years) before and after each assessment. Regressions control for house attributes (square
footage, number of bedrooms and bathrooms), IE settings, contamination level before assessments released, as well as
year and district fixed effects. Transactions are limited to houses within 3km of a brownfield site. Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.14: CCP Approximation
Utility Parameters
Travel Dist -0.0082
Psych MC -3.8215
Financial MC -0.2853
Mean Utility Forecast
θjt−1 0.5464
Time Period -0.9064
Dummy Variables -1.2785
-0.1201
-1.2873
-2.0402
-1.5651
E[logPr(dit+1 = 1|dit)]
Mean Min Max
N-by-J matrix -9.0399 -31.0834 -0.8658
# of Draws 25
Note: 25 draws from distribution of residuals from the mean utility forecast
were taken to form the expected log probability of choosing k conditional
on choice at t.
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Table 2.15: Binary Logit for Cleanup
est. s.e. p-value
# of assessments 0.4310 0.1351 0.0014
GW contamination -0.5002 0.3575 0.1617
Spending per Capita (in $100) 0.1307 0.0309 0.0000
Unemployment Rate 0.0624 0.0701 0.3736
1[Proposal Year] 1.6840 0.4035 0.0000
% Black (non-time varying) -1.7548 1.0994 0.1105
% Hispanic (non-time varying) -3.3975 1.3301 0.0106
Signal 0.0062 0.0814 0.9396
Constant -7.03 0.88 0.00
N 683
Note: Cleanup probabilities are predicted at each time period, for each site.
Neighborhood-level characteristics that may affect cleanup probability are taken
for the tract or district that contains the site.
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2.10 Figures
Figure 2.1: Assessment Example (Contents)
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Figure 2.2: Assessment Example (Soil Boring Results)
108
Figure 2.3: Public Notification
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Figure 2.4: Brownfields in Massachusetts
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Assessments over Time
Figure 2.6: Assessment Interval (in Years)
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Figure 2.7: Housing Prices 2 Years Before and After 1st Assessment
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Figure 2.8: Log-likelihood Plot for Prior Mean Grid Search
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Figure 2.9: Posterior Belief at each Signal Update
114
2.11 Appendix: EM Alogirthm
2.11.1 Expectation-step
The E-step involves estimating the most updated posterior beliefs on the hazard
(summarized by the distribution F (H)) given a guess at the learning parameters,
and then building the likelihood of observing the contamination results using the
estimated hazard belief (distribution). Since I assume that learning for each brown-
field (of each neighborhood) occurs independently, the most updated posteriors at
the pth iteration, ET (H)
(p) and VT (H)
(p), can be found for each brownfield k using the
current guess at the parameters, θ(p), with the following Bayesian updating formulas
ET (Hk)
(p) =
[
1
δ(p)
+
Nk
σ
(p)
e
]−1
·
(
1
σ
(p)
e
Nk∑
t=1
(
ckt − λ(p) · IEk
)
+
1
δ(p)
Hguess0
)
VT (Hk)
(p) =
[
1
δ(p)
+
Nk
σ
(p)
e
]−1
The above formulas essentially calculate a weighted average of the signals and the
given prior for each brownfield, where Nk denotes the total number of assessments
performed for a brownfield k. This recovers a hazard level for each brownfield, which
is also our best guess of each site’s hazard given the string of information updates.24
Given the most updated posteriors on the hazard, we can build the log-likelihood of
observing the contamination by integrating over the log probability of the observed
contamination with respect to the hazard.
2.11.2 Maximization-step
In the M-step, the likelihood from the E-step is maximized with respect to the
learning parameters to produce updated learning parameters,
[
λ(p+1), σ
(p+1)
e , δ(p+1)
]
.
24There is a concern that for sites that undergo very few assessments (e.g. 1), our ‘best’ guess
is not very good.
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Using the updated parameters,
[
λ(p+1), σ
(p+1)
e , δ(p+1)
]
, I return to the E-step and re-
estimate the posterior distribution on the hazard level. Dempster et al. (1977) show
that by iterating between the two steps, the estimates will eventually converge.
Using the Bayesian updating formulas, the final learning parameter estimates
given the guess of the prior, and the string of signals up until time t, we can construct
the beliefs about Hk at time t for each t in our time frame. I combine beliefs for
multiple brownfields within a neighborhood, j, by summing the belief distributions.
The resulting posterior beliefs for brownfield hazards in a neighborhood j, with Kj
brownfields, would be given by N
(
Et[H1] + · · ·+ Et[HKj ], Vt[H1] + · · ·+ Vt[HKj ]
)
.25
25This is since the sum of independent normal random variables is normal, and the learning
is assumed to be independent between brownfields, e.g. learning about one site does not provide
information about another.
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3Exceeding the Threshold: Hedonic Analysis of
Brownfield Contamination
with Gabrielle Inder1
3.1 Introduction
Public information on environmental quality is necessary for market-based polices
aimed at correcting environmental externalities to work. As these policies only func-
tion to the extent that households are aware of the pollution they face, provision of
environmental information is important from a policy perspective for two reasons.
First, improved information on pollution may allow households to adjust their be-
havior and make more informed decisions on mitigating pollution exposure (Viscusi
et al. (1986), Smith and Johnson (1988), Graff Zivin et al. (2011), Graff Zivin and
Neidell (2009)). Second, information provision can be a source of environmental regu-
lation by inducing polluting firms to reduce their pollution in response to household
demand for improved environmental quality (Hamilton (1995), Konar and Cohen
(1997), Khanna and Damon (1999), Powers (2013)). One of the main objectives
of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) (EPA
1Inder: Duke University Department of Economics
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(2014)), enacted in 1986, was to established reporting requirements for government
agencies and industry that handled hazardous and toxic chemicals so as to increase
public knowledge and access to pollution information, and eventually reduce pollu-
tion.
Because of this interest in information provision, there has been a wave of research
examining whether information or publicity about contamination is capitalized into
housing prices as a way of either testing whether households demand for environ-
mental quality or whether households adjust their risk perceptions in the face of
changing information (McClelland et al. (1990), Gayer and Viscusi (2002), Bui and
Mayer (2003), Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari (2006), Sanders (2013), Decker et al.
(2005)). Most of these papers find that information is capitalized into property values
negatively (postively) if households adjust risk perceptions upward (downward) after
information release. It is not surpising that, although findings are generally consis-
tent, estimates vary as multiple ways of quantifying ‘information’ have been used.
These measures include (but are not limited to) public administrative data on tox-
ins released (Bui and Mayer (2003), Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari (2006), Sanders
(2013), Decker et al. (2005)), newspaper coverage (Gayer and Viscusi (2002)), di-
rect solicitation of household perceived information (Gawande and Jenkins-Smith
(2001)), and environmental site or risk assessments (McClelland et al. (1990), Ma
(2014)). One reason for the range in estimates may simply be that people pay at-
tention to different forms of information differently. Bui and Mayer (2003) address
this possibility in their study of how information release from the Toxic Release In-
ventory (TRI) program impacts housing prices. In particular, they do not find that
increasing information provision affects housing prices, and attribute their findings
to the lack of ability for individuals to process the pollution information provided. If
the form of the information released through the TRI program is too complex, then
would characterizing information in other ways improve the chances of that informa-
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tion reaching households? From a policy perspective, shedding light on how the type
of information release can vary in its impact on household choices can be informative
as it may allow for better design of information provision programs aimed to inform
the public and improve pollution.
This paper aims to contribute to the literature in environmental information
provision by examining whether different types of information about brownfield con-
tamination capitalize into property values differently. More specifically, we examine
how housing values are impacted if information about contamination is released as
a continuous measure as opposed to a binary measure (i.e. exceeding a contami-
nation threshold value or not). We do this by exploiting variation in contaminant
thresholds used, holding constant the contaminant level, due to regulatory require-
ments for brownfield investigations in the state of Massachusetts. As the variation
in threshold levels are tied to the level of human exposure of the areas in which
these contaminated sites exist, threshold exceedance is potentially correlated with
unobserved neighborhood characteristics that also impact housing values. To deal
with this, we take an instrumental variables approach using variation in threshold
exceedance due to the location of underground water sources. Section 3.2 introduces
our study context using brownfields, and the reporting framework for contamination
that we exploit. Section 3.3 outlines a hedonic model, and discusses potential endo-
geneity issues related to our variables of interest. Section 3.4 examines the validity
of our instrumental variable, and gives the results. Finally, section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Study Context
This paper examines information provision for brownfields in the state of Mas-
sachusetts. The set of brownfields considered include a subset of the brownfields
tied to the US EPA Brownfields Program. In the following section, we begin with
a description of brownfields and the federal Brownfields Program. We then review
119
the reporting requirements on contamination that are specific to the state of Mas-
sachusetts, which allow us to test whether different information provision schemes
capitalize into housing values differently.
3.2.1 The Brownfields Program
While Massachusetts has no formal definition of a brownfield site, the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines a brownfield as a ‘real property, the
expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence
or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant’ (EPA
(2012)). In most cases, brownfield lands are the result of businesses engaging in
industrial or commercial activity that involved the use of toxic substances. The
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that there are over 450,000
brownfield lands in the U.S., and potentially more that have not been ‘discovered’ or
recognized. To encourage cleanup and redevelopment of these sites, the Small Busi-
ness Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act was signed in 2002. The
law relieved liability concerns for potential future owners by amending the provi-
sions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, and allocated grant funding for programs related to brownfield reme-
diation. There are four types of grants designated: assessment grants, job training
grants, cleanup grants and revolving loan fund grants. Each grant serves a different
purpose for the community; however all represent important aspects of remediation
efforts. These grants typically give up to $200,000 for their specified purpose. As-
sessment grants are the most common type of grant awarded, providing funds to be
used for planning of a brownfield cleanup. On the other hand, job training grant
funds are typically the least common, and are used to find and train unemployed and
low-income residents from brownfield- affected areas to assist with the site cleanup.
Cleanup grants remediate brownfields that have been exposed to petroleum or haz-
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ardous pollutant contamination. Finally, revolving loan fund grants help to capitalize
a revolving loan fund, providing loans and sub-grants for clean up processes. Between
2002 and 2011, the U.S EPA awarded over $670 million for Brownfield grants.2 The
set of brownfields considered in this study include those for which a cleanup grant
application was submitted to the EPA from Massachusetts.
3.2.2 Contamination Reporting in Massachusetts
Before any cleanup efforts can commence, a brownfield site must be assessed for its
contaminants. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA-
DEP) follows a set of guidelines outlined in the Massachusetts Contingency Plan
(MCP), which details a formal process for investigating and remediating contami-
nated lands. The MCP requires site assessments be performed by licensed profes-
sionals at the discovery of potential contamination. For each assessment, samples
of soil, groundwater, air, and sediments are taken, and tested for suspected haz-
ardous substances. The amounts of the toxins (e.g. microgram per liter (ug/l)
for surface/groundwater or microgram per gram (ug/g) for soil/sediments) are then
compared to a threshold level for that specific toxin that is considered hazardous for
humans. The thresholds with which to compare toxin levels are lower if there are
higher risks of human exposure (e.g. school) or environmental damages (e.g. wet-
land). Specifically in Massachusetts, these standards are defined as GW-1 through
GW-3 for groundwater, with GW-1 being the highest threshold, and S-1 through S-3
for soil, with S-1 being the highest threshold. The MA-DEP uses specific criteria for
human population and land uses near each property to categorize sites and determine
which threshold standards to use for evaluating pollution risk. For human popula-
tions, it examines whether there is residential population within a mile, institutions
(e.g. schools, hospitals, community centers) within 500 feet, and on-site workers. For
2$331.3 million for 1,479 assessment grants, $25.2 million for 121 job training grants, $150.7
million for 801 cleanup grants, and $167.5 million for 143 revolving loan grants
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land use, more weight is given to sites that are near a sole source aquifer, potentially
productive aquifer, or within 500 feet of a drinking water source, especially where
no alternate water supply exists. Given this method of evaluating contamination, it
is possible to observe two brownfield sites with the same amount of toxicity, but one
exceeds a contamination threshold and the other does not due to the environment
around the site. This creates a situation in which, with the appropriate econometric
methods, we can test to see if households care about exceeding the threshold for
contamination while holding toxicity constant, or the actual amounts of the toxicity.
In particular, are threshold violations capitalized by the housing market.
3.3 Model
Rosen (1974) provided the theoretical foundations for using property transaction
prices to reveal household willingness to pay for non-marketed amenities. We follow
the previous literature by examining threshold effects within a property value hedonic
model. To examine whether exceeding a threshold for contamination affects housing
prices, while holding the level of toxicity constant, we model the price of a property
that is located in school district, j, near brownfield site, m, as the following
Pijmt = α0 + α1 ·maxtoxmt + α1 · exceedmt + ijmt (3.1)
where the dependent variable, Pijmt, is the log price for house i in district j near
brownfield m at time t, and ijmt is an idiosyncratic shock that is specific to the
property at time t. The variables of interest are maxtoxmt, which refers to the
toxicity found at brownfield m at time t, and exceedmt, which is a dummy variable
that equals to 1 if the amount of toxicity found at t exceeds a threshold value that
is deemed hazardous. We expand the model to control for other factors that may
influence housing prices, including property structural characteristics, Xit, observable
time-varying district-level characteristics, NBDjt, and characteristics of the nearest
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brownfield site that do not vary with time, BFm
Pijmt = α0 + α1 ·maxtoxmt + α1 · exceedmt +Xitβ +NBDjtγ +BFmδ + ijmt (3.2)
Structural characteristics include the number of bathrooms and bedrooms, square
footage, age, and dummy variables for whether the property is a condo or a single
family house. Time-varying neighborhood attributes include measures of poverty,
crime, and education. Time-invariant brownfield site characteristics include whether
a site is eventually awarded with cleanup, the proposal score, the grant application
type (petroleum, hazardous substances, or both), property size, whether there has
ever been industrial activity, residential dwellings, or greenspace nearby, and whether
there are schools within 500 meters of the brownfield property.
Beyond these observable attributes for which we have data, there may still be
unobserved aspects of residential properties that are correlated with our variables of
interest and affect housing prices. First, if certain brownfield neighborhoods are lo-
cated in historically more industrial communities that are also likely to have higher
contamination levels, then we might overstate the negative impact of contamina-
tion on housing prices. Second, as described in the previous section, contamination
exceedance depends on the local environment around the site, and thus may be corre-
lated with attributes of the neighborhood around the brownfield that are unobserved
by the researcher. In particular, brownfield sites with more chances of human expo-
sure have higher chances of exceeding thresholds (holding the level of contamination
constant), but these sites may also be the ones that are located near more amenities.
If local amenities raise housing prices, then one would expect the presence of these
unobserved amenities to diminish threshold exceedance’s negative effect on housing
prices. We decompose the idiosyncratic error term to include district-specific factors,
µj, and brownfield-specific factors, νmt,
ijmt = µj + νmt + ηijmt (3.3)
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To deal with unobserved time-invariant district attributes, we use school district-level
fixed effects and demean the model in (3.2)
P ijmt = α1 ·maxtoxmt + α1 · exceedmt (3.4)
+ X itβ +NBDjtγ +BFmδ + νmt + ηijmt
where Y ijmt = Yijmt −
∑
i,m,t∈j Yijmt. Using the within-estimator removes the time-
invariant factors at the district level, µj, that are correlated with the amount of
contamination found at sites, maxtoxmt.
To deal with endogeneity related to threshold exceedance, we employ an in-
strumental variables strategy based on site assessment rules for thresholds in Mas-
sachusetts. As briefly mentioned in the preceding section, the presence of under-
ground water sources are used to select the appropriate thresholds with which to
compare contaminant levels in addition to proximity to human institutions. If the
presence of underground water sources are uncorrelated with the institutions that
also serve as neighborhood amenities, then we could induce variation in the likeli-
hood of exceeding a threshold while holding constant the unobserved factors νmt, and
consistently estimate α1. Specifically, we use whether a brownfield site is located on
top of an aquifer, that is,
aquiferm =
{
1 if brownfield to aquifer distance = 0
0 otherwise
The geographic variation provided by aquifer location may better control for in-
stitutional factors than school district fixed effects because it is at a finer level of
geography, at which threshold exceedances for brownfield sites are more likely deter-
mined. For aquiferm to be a valid instrument, it must be the case that (1) being
situated above an aquifer leads to a higher chance of brownfield contamination levels
exceeding thresholds (instrument relevance), or
E
(
aquiferm · exceedmt | maxtoxmt, Xit, NBDjt, BFm
) 6= 0 (3.5)
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and (2) aquifer location is not correlated with other unobserved factors that affect
housing prices (instrument exogeneity) so that after controlling for district-level un-
observables,
E
(
aquiferm · νmt | maxtoxmt, Xit, NBDjt, BFm
)
= 0 (3.6)
As the exogeneity condition is not formally testable, one can look to see if sig-
nificant differences still exist for observable house attributes after conditioning on
the instrument. Of special concern for the exogeneity of the instrument is whether
the presence of an aquifer is correlated with whether residences are groundwater or
piped-water dependent for a source of drinking water. As groundwater dependent
houses may be located in more suburban areas, locating on an aquifer may negatively
impact housing prices outside of its effect through threshold exceedance. Unfortu-
nately, because public data on geographic coverage for Piped Water Service Areas
(PWSAs) in Massachusetts is incomplete, we cannot currently control for this omit-
ted variable. Going forward, we plan on working to obtain this data on PWSAs. We
discuss the results from ‘balance tests’ (Chay and Greenstone (2005)) to assess the
validity of the instrument in Section 5.
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
3.4.1 Brownfields Toxicity and Threshold Data
The set of brownfield sites considered are those that submitted applications to the
EPA for a cleanup grant from 2003 to 2008. Figure 3.1 maps the brownfield sites
in Massachusetts. Data on contamination from brownfield site investigations are
collected from assessment reports that were compiled by Licensed Environmental
Site Professionals.3 For this analysis, information on the amount of contaminants
and threshold levels were collected.
3For more detailed information about these reports, see Ma (2014)
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Most assessments collected pollutant concentrations for soil and groundwater,
while air and sediment data was sporadically collected when a perceived threat was
in existence. The majority of sites collected soil and groundwater from 4 to 10 loca-
tions around the site to determine differences in pollutant concentrations. Multiple
samples of the same pollutant can be collected, and the maximum detected concen-
tration for each pollutant was recorded for this data set. Since different chemicals
have different safety level concentrations, concentration values were assessed against
their corresponding threshold values to make the toxicity comparable across chemi-
cals. Specifically, concentration is divided by the threshold value and multiplied by
100, giving the relative danger of that contaminant. This approach implies that any
toxicity over 100 indicates an exceedance of the threshold for that given contaminant.
For the 66 brownfield sites analyzed, 17 have yet to be cleaned, while the majority
have undergone some form of remediation. In total, 293 unique chemicals were
listed as found across all sites, which can be classified into 20 groups, including post
transition metals, transition metals, xylenes, ringed polyaromatic hydrocarbons and
napthalenes.4 See Table 3.1 for a list of chemical groups, and Table 3.2 for a list of
chemicals found. Approximately 9,000 data points were recorded as the maximum
concentrations of unique chemicals at all sites in all mediums. As many of the
chemicals are complements in industrial/commercial production processes, rather
than trying to distinguish between the effects of exceeding each of the 293 chemical
thresholds, the maximum toxicity value was taken for each investigation, regardless
of the chemical, to avoid issues relating to multicollinearity. An investigation finds a
threshold exceedance if at least one chemical exceeds its threshold value. Table 3.3
gives summary statistics for site investigations.
4It is important to note that every site was not tested for every chemical. This is because some
chemicals, such as pesticides, are only produced or used in certain industrial sites, and thus would
not be present in all brownfield locations.
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3.4.2 Housing and Neighborhood Data
Housing transactions data are purchased from Dataquick Information Services through
Duke University, and provide the universe of housing transactions in the state of
Massachusetts from 1998 through 2011. The data contain detailed house attributes
recorded from the most recent tax assessment, including square footage, age, the
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, and longitude and latitude coordinates. Infor-
mation about the history of transactions for each property includes the transaction
price and date, the names of the buyers and sellers, as well as information about the
buyer’s mortgage loan.
The analysis limits transaction types to arms length transactions and properties
that are owner-occupied. Observations that are missing in any of the attributes are
dropped, as well as houses that have undergone major improvements after the be-
ginning of the sample time frame. Houses that sold more than once per year or four
times per the window of house sales (14 years) are excluded. Prices are normalized to
January 2000 dollars using the monthly All Urban Consumer Price Index for Hous-
ing in the U.S. Northeast Region available from the Index (2012). The analysis then
excludes the 1st and 99th percentile of the observed price distribution. As brown-
fields are fairly local disamenties, to ensure that they are capitalized into housing
prices, houses are first mapped to the nearest brownfield site using a Geographical
Information System (GIS), and then only houses within 3km of a brownfield site are
retained. Summary statistics for the housing data are given in Panel A of Table 3.4.
District level data in Massachusetts are obtained from Mass.gov, the official state
website. Districts are defined as areas where ‘public education services [are provided]
for the area’s residents’ (U.S. Census Bureau). We retrieve information on crime,
school quality and a measure of poverty for the 89 school districts within 3km of
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brownfield sites.5 Data describing exposure to crime are taken from the FBI Uni-
form Crime Reports. This gives the number of violent crimes as reported by police
agencies (corresponding to towns/cities) in Massachusetts from 1998 to 2011. Crime
levels are then divided by the population for each district over time to make the
measure more comparable across geographic areas. As a measure of school quality,
we use the percentage of grade 10 students in each school district that achieved a
score of Advanced or Proficient in math on the Massachusetts Comprehensive As-
sessment System (MCAS) test. We take the percentage of students in each district
that come from low income households to gauge the poverty level for each district.
Both measures are available at the school district level from 1998 to 2011 from the
Massachusetts Department of Education website. Summary statistics for the housing
data are given in Panel B of Table 3.4.
Locations for aquifers in Massachusetts are retrieved from the Office of Geo-
graphic Information (MassGIS (2014)), and mapped to the nearest brownfield sites
based on the longitude and latitude coordinates using GIS. Figure 3.2 outlines the
aquifers in Massachusetts. Brownfields are considered exposed to aquifers if it is
situated directly above any portion of the aquifer.
3.5 Results
Table 3.5 gives the estimates from the basic hedonic regression. Column (1) pro-
vides estimates that control for structural characteristics of the house as well as site
characteristics. Column (2) adds controls for district and brownfield characteristics.
Column (3) controls for unobserved, time-invariant differences across school districts
by including district-level fixed effects. The parameter on maxtox is negative and
significant until fixed effects for district are included, which alludes to the concern
raised earlier that brownfield sites in more industrial areas may cause an overstate-
5There are a total of 224 school districts in the state of Massachusetts.
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ment of the depressed effect of toxicity on housing prices. With a median maxtox
concentration of 3.92 found across all assessments, the effect of toxicity on housing
prices is economically insignificant.
The OLS and FE estimators also find that exceeding contaminant thresholds
respectively lead to housing price increases of 7.39% and 6.36% after controlling for
observable neighborhood attributes and district-level unobservables. This counter-
intuitive result is likely due to unobserved factors that are correlated with threshold
exceedance and price. Examination of house attributes by threshold exceedance
(Table 3.6, Panel A), and district attributes by threshold exceedance (Table 3.6,
Panel B) suggest that there are clearly significant differences between houses sold
near sites where assessments revealed that contaminants exceed thresholds versus
those that did not. In the lower sections of panels A and B, attributes are compared
after demeaning by district to account for fixed effects.
Most differences in physical house characteristics are rejected, but to the extent
that data on structural characteristics is fairly comprehensive, these can be controlled
for. The significant differences in neighborhood attributes are more concerning as
they are more likely sources of bias for the estimated parameter on exceedthreshold.
The within-district means of % low income and % crime (neighborhood ‘bads’) are
higher for areas where thresholds were not exceeded. If areas with fewer neigh-
borhood ‘bads’ coincide with better neighborhood amenities, then, based on Mass-
DEP regulations, one would find a higher instance of threshold exceedance, which
may be the reason for the counter-intuitive positive estimate on the coefficient for
exceedthreshold.
To deal with this endogeneity problem, we instrument for exceedthreshold using
a dummy variable for whether a site is located over an aquifer, denoted aquifer.
The relevance condition should be satisfied since the MA Contingency Plan speci-
fies that different thresholds be used for contaminants if the site is located near an
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underground water source. Moreover, this can be tested in the first stage of the
the IV regression. More difficult to justify is whether the location of the aquifer is
uncorrelated with other determinants of housing prices, and that its only effect on
housing prices is through increasing the chance of exceeding contaminant thresholds.
We limit the sample of houses near brownfields that are within 500 meters of an
aquifer.6 Table 3.7 presents house (Panel A, top) and district (Panel B, top) at-
tributes for brownfields by location on an aquifer. Significant differences by aquifer
location exist in the number of bathrooms, percentage of condo and single family
homes. These are likely due to the fact that brownfields, and the proximate houses,
in more urban areas where there are more space constraints are less likely to locate
on aquifers. To limit the comparison of houses that are more similar, we remove
all condos in one of our instrumental variables specifications. Finally, note that by
splitting the sample by aquifer rather than threshold exceedance the differences in
neighborhood attributes are no longer significant.
First stage estimates using aquifer as an instrument for thresholds are given in
Column (1) of Table 3.9. The corresponding IV estimates are provided in Column (2).
As expected, locating on an aquifer significantly increases the chances of exceeding
contamination thresholds, satisfying the relevance condition for the instrument. The
IV estimate finds that exceeding a threshold leads to a 10.8% decline in housing
prices, and that after accounting for this threshold exceedance, increasing toxicity has
a statistically insignificant effect. This coefficient is significant at the 5% level with
standard errors clustered at the school district level. Finally, we remove all condos
from our sample (approx. 20%), and present results in Column (3). The estimate
on threshold exceedance becomes insignificant. This could be potentially concerning
if places with condos in suburban Massachusetts are the residences that are serviced
6Table 3.10 give results that increase this distance. Generally, farther distances to aquifer causes
the estimate on threshold exceedance to be insignificant. This is not surprising as aquifer location
becomes less of a determinant in threshold exceedance for brownfields far from aquifers.
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by piped water. In this case, since the magnitude of the estimate decreased, it would
suggest that we have removed some of the correlation between aquifer location and
PWSA, which would invalidate the instrument. Therefore, to have more definitive
results, recovering data maps for PWSA is important for this paper going forward.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper examines if pollution information capitalizes into housing values differ-
ently depending on how it is conveyed. Since brownfield contamination can be dis-
closed as a continuous or discrete measure, and since the thresholds for the discrete
measures vary in our context while holding contamination constant, we are able to
test whether exceeding a threshold on contamination even matters after conditioning
on the actual level of contamination. An additional complication arises with esti-
mating the effect of threshold exceedance on housing prices: contaminant thresholds
are endogenous as they depend on the proximity to institutions around the site that
could affect housing values. We deal with this endogeneity problem by using aquifer
location as an instrument to induce variation in the likelihood of exceeding toxin
thresholds.
In our fixed effects specification that ignores threshold endogeneity, we find that
exceeding thresholds leads to an increase in housing values of around 5% after con-
trolling for house attributes, time-varying neighborhood attributes, brownfield at-
tributes, and school district-level fixed effects. We also find that the actual amount
of toxicity has a negative but insignificant effect on housing prices. This counter-
intuitive result on threshold exceedance suggests that the fixed effect estimator that
removes time-invariant unobserved factors at the district level does not adequately
control for the local amenity differences at a finer geographic level that are also corre-
lated with threshold exceedance. We examine the differences in attribute means con-
ditional on our instrument (as opposed to threshold exceedance) to check if attributes
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are balanced across our instrument. After instrumenting for threshold exceedance
with presence of an aquifer, our estimates indicate a 10.8% decrease in housing values
from exceeding contaminant thresholds. The parameter on continuous toxicity val-
ues remains insignificant in the IV specification. Finally, the most obvious threat to
the exogeneity of the instrument is whether aquifer presence is negatively correlated
with a property’s dependence on piped water systems, which would tend to depress
house values holding other attributes constant. After controlling for piped water
service areas in eastern Massachusetts, we do not find any changes in our estimates.
Although it is encouraging that our estimate is robust to the inclusion of the piped
water area dummy variable, until more complete data on piped water systems can
be obtained, we cannot completely rule out this concern.
The findings in this paper suggest that information presented in a more inter-
pretable manner (binary thresholds) are easier to process. More specifically, binary
categories used to evaluate contamination is negatively capitalized into housing mar-
kets, whereas the effect of a continuous toxicity measure is statistically insignificant.
Given this result, if one of the aims of the TRI program or the Right-to-Know act
is to develop an informed public, then careful consideration of the format in which
information is presented is important, and would play a large role in helping infor-
mation provision policies to achieve that outcome.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Chemical Group by Threshold Exceedance
exceedthreshold
Chemical Group 0 1 Total
Post Transition Metals 155 100 255
Transition Metals 707 179 886
Alkaline Earth & Alkali Metals 384 102 486
Other Elements & Asbestos 287 60 347
Aliphatics 444 154 598
Other Aromatics 947 222 1,169
Xylenes 225 29 254
3 ring PAH 661 65 726
4 ring PAH 326 119 445
5+ ring PAH 563 275 838
PCB & Oil 130 32 162
Hydrocarbons & Other organics 194 13 207
Organochlorides 580 185 765
Aromatic Organochlorides 185 21 206
Organobromides 95 4 99
Naphthalenes 295 39 334
Pesticides 101 14 115
Ketone 97 11 108
Aromatics with multiple substitent groups 125 19 144
Nitro containing compounds 88 8 96
Total 6,589 1,651 8,240
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Table 3.2: List of Chemicals
Chemical Freq. Percent Chemical Freq. Percent Chemical Freq. Percent
1,1,1,2 Tetrachloroethane 11 0.13 Aroclor 1221 13 0.16 Fluoranthene 152 1.84
1,1,1 Tetrachloroethane 1 0.01 Aroclor 1232 13 0.16 Fluorene 147 1.78
1,1,1 Trichloroethane 52 0.63 Aroclor 1242 15 0.18 Freon 11 2 0.02
1,1,2,2 Tetrachloroethane 14 0.17 Aroclor 1248 19 0.23 Freon 113 3 0.04
1,1,2 Trichloroethane 15 0.18 Aroclor 1250 2 0.02 Freon 114 1 0.01
1,1,2 Trichlorotrifluoroethane 2 0.02 Aroclor 1254 28 0.34 Freon 12 2 0.02
1,1 Biphenyl 1 0.01 Aroclor 1260 32 0.39 Heptachlor 7 0.08
1,1 Dichloroethane 45 0.55 Aroclor 1262 9 0.11 Heptachlor Epoxide 3 0.04
1,1 Dichloroethene 24 0.29 Aroclor 1268 8 0.1 Heptane 1 0.01
1,1 Dichloroethylene 7 0.08 Arsenic 158 1.92 Hexachlorobenzene 7 0.08
1,1 Dichloropropene 7 0.08 Asbestos 3 0.04 Hexachlorobutadiene 15 0.18
1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9 OCDD 2 0.02 Azobenzene 3 0.04 Hexachlorocyclopentadiene 1 0.01
1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9 OCDF 2 0.02 Barium 138 1.67 Hexachloroethane 4 0.05
1,2,3,4,6,7,8 HpCDD 4 0.05 Benzene 130 1.58 Indeno (1,2,3 cd) pyrene 140 1.7
1,2,3,4,7,8,9 HpCDF 2 0.02 Benzo (a) anthracene 145 1.76 Iodomethane 1 0.01
1,2,3,4,7,8 HxCDD 2 0.02 Benzo (a) pyrene 145 1.76 Iron 18 0.22
1,2,3,4,7,8 HxCDF 2 0.02 Benzo (a,e) pyrene 1 0.01 Isophorone 8 0.1
1,2,3,6,7,8 HxCDD 2 0.02 Benzo (b) fluoranthene 146 1.77 Isopropanol 1 0.01
1,2,3,6,7,8 HxCDF 2 0.02 Benzo (e) pyrene 7 0.08 Isopropyl Ether 1 0.01
1,2,3,7,8,9 HxCDD 2 0.02 Benzo (g,h,i) perylene 130 1.58 Lead 178 2.16
1,2,3,7,8,9 HxCDF 1 0.01 Benzo (j,k) Fluoranthene 1 0.01 Magnesium 13 0.16
1,2,3,7,8 PeCDD 2 0.02 Benzo (k) fluoranthene 141 1.71 Manganese 19 0.23
1,2,3,7,8 PeCDF 2 0.02 Benzoic Acid 1 0.01 Mercury 125 1.52
1,2,3 Trichlorobenzene 16 0.19 Benzyl chloride 1 0.01 Methoxychlor 5 0.06
1,2,3 Trichloropropane 8 0.1 Beryllium 80 0.97 Methyl Ethyl Ketone 2 0.02
1,2,3 Trimethylbenzene 1 0.01 Bis (2 Chloroethoxy) Methane 4 0.05 Methyl Isobutyl Ketone 6 0.07
1,2,4 Trichlorobenzene 24 0.29 Bis (2 Chloroethy) Ether 5 0.06 Methyl tert butyl ether 131 1.59
1,2,4 Trimethylbenzene 75 0.91 Bis (2 Ethyhexyl) phthalate 15 0.18 Methylene Chloride 33 0.4
1,2 Dibromo 3 Chloropropane 8 0.1 Bis (2 Ethylhexyl) phthalate 2 0.02 Motor Oil 1 0.01
1,2 Dibromoethane 12 0.15 Bromobenzene 10 0.12 N Nitrosodiphenylamine 2 0.02
1,2 Dichlorobenzene 32 0.39 Bromochloromethane 10 0.12 Naphthalene 210 2.55
1,2 Dichloroethane 21 0.25 Bromodichloromethane 13 0.16 Nickel 102 1.24
1,2 Dichloropropane 15 0.18 Bromoform 14 0.17 Nitrate 1 0.01
1,2 Diphenylhydrazine 1 0.01 Bromomethane 16 0.19 Nitrite 1 0.01
1,2 dichloropropane 1 0.01 Butylbenzylphtalate 7 0.08 Nitrobenzene 4 0.05
1,3,5 Trimethylbenzene 69 0.84 C10 C28 Medium Petroleum Distillate 1 0.01 Pentachlorophenol 12 0.15
1,3 Butadiene 3 0.04 C11 C22 Aromatics 179 2.17 Perchloroethylene 1 0.01
1,3 Dichlorobenzene 26 0.32 C13 C16 Aliphatics 1 0.01 Perylene 5 0.06
1,3 Dichloropropane 7 0.08 C16 C36 Heavy Petroleum Distillate 1 0.01 Pesticides 3 0.04
1,4 Dichlorobenzene 38 0.46 C19 C22 Aromatics 1 0.01 Phenanthrene 161 1.95
1,4 Dioxane 8 0.1 C19 C36 Aliphatics 174 2.11 Phenol 7 0.08
1 Methylnaphthalene 12 0.15 C5 C10 Aromatics 2 0.02 Phosphorus 1 0.01
2,2 Dichloropropane 7 0.08 C5 C8 Aliphatics 127 1.54 Potassium 9 0.11
2,2 Oxybis (1 Chloropropane) 3 0.04 C6 C12 Light Petroleum Distillate 1 0.01 Propylene 1 0.01
2,3,4,6,7,8 HxCDF 2 0.02 C6 C36 Aromatics 2 0.02 Pyrene 154 1.87
2,3,4,7,8 PeCDF 2 0.02 C6 C8 Aliphatics 2 0.02 Pyridine 2 0.02
2,3,7,8 TCDD 2 0.02 C9 C10 Aromatics 128 1.55 Selenium 105 1.27
2,3,7,8 TCDD TEQ 1 0.01 C9 C12 Aliphatics 128 1.55 Silver 117 1.42
2,3,7,8 TCDF 2 0.02 C9 C18 Aliphatics 165 2 Sodium 9 0.11
2,4,5 Trichlorophenol 6 0.07 C9 C36 Aliphatics 1 0.01 Styrene 17 0.21
2,4,6 Trichlorophenol 5 0.06 Cadmium 135 1.64 Sulfate 1 0.01
2,4 Dichlorophenol 4 0.05 Calcium 9 0.11 Tetrachlorethene 64 0.78
2,4 Dimethylphenol 6 0.07 Carbazole 10 0.12 Tetrachloroethylene 18 0.22
2,4 Dinitrophenol 4 0.05 Carbon Disulfide 14 0.17 Tetrahydrofuran 8 0.1
2,4 Dinitrotoluene 4 0.05 Carbon Tetrachloride 13 0.16 Thallium 68 0.83
2,6 Dimethylnaphthalene 3 0.04 Chlordane 2 0.02 Toluene 147 1.78
2,6 Dinitrotoluene 4 0.05 Chlorobenzene 29 0.35 Trichloro fluoro methane 2 0.02
2 Butanone 26 0.32 Chlorodibromomethane 3 0.04 Trichloroethene 62 0.75
2 Chloronaphthalene 8 0.1 Chloroethane 20 0.24 Trichloroethylene 20 0.24
2 Chlorophenol 4 0.05 Chloroform 21 0.25 Trichlorofluoromethane 9 0.11
2 Chlorotoluene 9 0.11 Chloromethane 15 0.18 Vanadium 69 0.84
2 Hexanone 12 0.15 Chromium 151 1.83 Vinyl Acetate 5 0.06
2 Methylnaphthalene 159 1.93 Chrysene 146 1.77 Vinyl Chloride 42 0.51
2 Methylphenol 5 0.06 Cobalt 8 0.1 Xylene 92 1.12
2 Nitroaniline 2 0.02 Copper 50 0.61 Zinc 109 1.32
2 Nitrophenol 4 0.05 Cyanide 29 0.35 alpha BHC 4 0.05
3,3 Dichlorobenzidine 4 0.05 Cyclohexane 1 0.01 alpha Chlordane 4 0.05
3 Nitroaniline 2 0.02 Di n Butylphthalate 13 0.16 beta BHC 5 0.06
4,4’ DDD 9 0.11 Di n Octylphthalate 6 0.07 bis (2 Chloroisopropyl) Ether 1 0.01
4,4’ DDE 9 0.11 Dibenzo (a,h) anthracene 127 1.54 cis 1,2 Dichloroethene 45 0.55
4,4’ DDT 11 0.13 Dibenzofuran 18 0.22 cis 1,2 Dichloroethylene 10 0.12
4,6 Dinitro 2 Methylphenol 2 0.02 Dibenzothiophene 2 0.02 cis 1,3 Dichloropropene 13 0.16
4 Isopropyltoluene 1 0.01 Dibromochloromethane 10 0.12 cis Dichloroethene 8 0.1
4 Bromophenyl phenylether 4 0.05 Dibromoethane 1 0.01 delta BHC 2 0.02
4 Chloro 3 Methylphenol 2 0.02 Dibromomethane 6 0.07 gamma BHC 3 0.04
4 Chloroaniline 4 0.05 Dichlorodifluoromethane 12 0.15 gamma Chlordane 6 0.07
4 Chlorophenyl Phenyl Ether 2 0.02 Dichloromethane 1 0.01 isopropylbenzene 54 0.66
4 Chlorotoluene 11 0.13 Dieldrin 11 0.13 m/p Cresol 1 0.01
4 Ethyltoluene 1 0.01 Diethyl Ether 4 0.05 m/p Xylene 86 1.04
4 Isopropylbenzene 1 0.01 Diethylphthalate 6 0.07 n Butylbenzene 49 0.59
4 Isopropyltoluene 23 0.28 Diisopropyl Ether 6 0.07 n Hexane 1 0.01
4 Methyl 2 Pentanone 9 0.11 Dimethylphthalate 4 0.05 n Nitroso di n Propylamine 2 0.02
4 Methylphenol 5 0.06 Dioxins 5 0.06 n Propylbenzene 59 0.72
4 Nitroaniline 2 0.02 Endosulfan 1 0.01 o Chlorotoluene 1 0.01
4 Nitrophenol 3 0.04 Endosulfan I 3 0.04 o Cresol 1 0.01
4 nitrophenol 1 0.01 Endosulfan II 3 0.04 o Xylene 76 0.92
Acenaphthene 140 1.7 Endosulfan Sulfate 1 0.01 p Chlorotoluene 1 0.01
Acenaphthylene 132 1.6 Endosulfan sulfate 1 0.01 p Isopropyltoluene 27 0.33
Acetone 40 0.49 Endrin 3 0.04 sec Butylbenzene 51 0.62
Acetophenone 5 0.06 Endrin Aldehyde 1 0.01 tert Amyl Methyl Ether 7 0.08
Aldrin 3 0.04 Endrin Ketone 4 0.05 tert Butylalcohol 1 0.01
Aluminum 9 0.11 Ethanol 1 0.01 tert Butylbenzene 19 0.23
Aniline 5 0.06 Ether 2 0.02 tert Butylethyl Ether 3 0.04
Anthracene 146 1.77 Ethyl Acetate 1 0.01 trans 1,2 Dichloroethene 21 0.25
Antimony 81 0.98 Ethyl Ether 1 0.01 trans 1,2 Dichloroethylene 9 0.11
Aroclor 5 0.06 Ethyl tert butyl Ether 3 0.04 trans 1,3 Dichloropropane 1 0.01
Aroclor 1016 13 0.16 Ethylbenzene 150 1.82 trans 1,3 Dichloropropene 12 0.15
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Table 3.5: Hedonic Price Regression
Dependent Variable:
log(Price) OLS FE
exceedthreshold -0.0165*** 0.0739*** 0.0636***
(0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0031)
maxtox -1.61e-10*** -4.04e-10*** -2.16E-11
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Distance to Brownfield 8.22e-05*** 5.87e-05*** 7.45e-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
# Bathrooms 0.184*** 0.156*** 0.130***
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0015)
# Bedrooms -0.0285*** -0.0162*** -0.00799***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Sq. Ft. 0.000135*** 0.000119*** 0.000119***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Year Built 0.0252*** -0.0509*** 0.0122***
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Age 0.0258*** -0.0508*** 0.0112***
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013)
Condominium 0.175*** 0.112*** 0.143***
(0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0034)
Single family 0.215*** 0.0407*** -0.0928***
(0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0042)
Awarded 0.345*** -0.0802*** -0.0375***
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0067)
Proposal score 0.00476*** 0.00725*** 0.00552***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Hazardous substances -0.303*** 0.0950*** -0.118***
(0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0200)
Petroleum -0.417*** -0.126*** -0.118***
(0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0174)
Property size (acres) 0.000101 -0.00293*** 0.0175***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007)
% Low income 0.00497*** 0.000434
(0.0001) (0.0003)
% Crime -7.912*** 0.0995
(0.4067) (0.6570)
% Proficient or Advanced 0.0142*** -0.00254***
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Industrial activity nearby -0.351*** -0.0928***
(0.0030) (0.0059)
Residential nearby -0.0602*** -0.177***
(0.0030) (0.0045)
School nearby 0.0984*** 0.0723***
(0.0026) (0.0040)
Greenspace nearby 0.0761*** 0.0691***
(0.0031) (0.0043)
Constant -39.91*** 111.9*** -13.30***
(2.1207) (2.3697) (2.5579)
Obs. 157,140 150,430 150,430
R-squared 0.332 0.506 0.358
House Characteristics X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Neighborhood Characteristics X X
District Fixed Effects X
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Attributes by Exceed Threshold
A. House Attributes
exceedthreshold = 1 exceedthreshold = 0
Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. t-stat p-val Reject?
Price 215403.15 123752.52 125710 195149.77 108658.53 29244 -25.77 0.00 Y
# Bathrooms 1.78 0.90 125710 1.77 0.91 29244 -1.61 0.11 N
# Bedrooms 3.10 1.69 125710 3.05 1.61 29244 -4.53 0.00 Y
Sq. Ft. 1703.18 1175.03 125710 1696.55 1067.49 29244 -0.88 0.38 N
Condominium 0.23 0.42 125710 0.21 0.41 29244 -5.99 0.00 Y
Single Family 0.61 0.49 125710 0.66 0.47 29244 13.77 0.00 Y
Age 56.30 41.03 124636 51.84 43.17 28815 -16.45 0.00 Y
exceedthreshold = 1 exceedthreshold = 0
Demean by District Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. t-stat p-val Reject?
Price 11812.42 100756.67 125710 7034.18 89251.27 29244 -7.46 0.00 Y
# Bathrooms 0.00 0.88 125710 0.01 0.89 29244 2.06 0.04 Y
# Bedrooms -0.01 1.64 125710 -0.05 1.59 29244 -4.02 0.00 Y
Sq. Ft. -3.28 1152.21 125710 -20.82 1050.88 29244 -2.38 0.02 Y
Condo 0.01 0.38 125710 0.02 0.39 29244 5.01 0.00 Y
Single Family -0.01 0.44 125710 -0.02 0.45 29244 -4.96 0.00 Y
Age 1.12 38.14 124636 -0.10 40.82 28815 -4.80 0.00 Y
B. Neighborhood Attributes
exceedthreshold = 1 exceedthreshold = 0
Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. t-stat p-val Reject?
% Low income 28.74 23.17 614 25.12 22.44 136 -1.66 0.10 Y
% Crime 4.82E-03 4.32E-03 606 3.86E-03 3.94E-03 134 -2.38 0.02 Y
% Proficient or Advanced 59.97 19.48 614 60.85 21.48 136 0.47 0.64 N
exceedthreshold = 1 exceedthreshold = 0
Demean by District Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs. t-stat p-val Reject?
% Low income 1.34 5.12 614 1.23 3.75 136 -0.25 0.80 N
% Crime -2.38E-04 1.80E-03 606 1.13E-04 1.37E-03 134 2.13 0.03 Y
% Proficient or Advanced 7.76 13.78 614 7.30 13.12 136 -0.35 0.73 N
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Table 3.9: Hedonic Price Regression with Instrumental Variables
First Stage IV IV
Remove Condos
Dependent Variable: exceedthreshold log(Price) log(Price)
exceedthreshold -0.108** -0.0770
(0.0426) (0.0564)
aquifer 0.849***
(0.0437)
maxtox -1.04e-10* -3.79E-12 1.07E-11
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Distance to Brownfield 2.40e-06 5.19e-05*** 6.53e-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
# Bathrooms -0.00349 0.0896*** 0.0709***
(0.0023) (0.0142) (0.0126)
# Bedrooms -5.11e-05 -0.00167 0.000372
(0.0009) (0.0078) (0.0070)
Sq. Ft. 2.25e-07 0.000117*** 0.000107***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Year Built -0.0150 0.00617 0.00804
(0.0181) (0.0085) (0.0080)
Age -0.0151 0.00419 0.00583
(0.0181) (0.0086) (0.0080)
Single Family -0.00190 0.128*** 0.0898***
(0.0057) (0.0362) (0.0317)
Condominium -0.00849 -0.228***
(0.0098) (0.0661)
Awarded 0.566*** 0.0398 -0.0122
(0.0683) (0.0310) (0.0306)
Proposal Score (std.) -0.00204 0.00484*** 0.00467**
(0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0020)
Hazardous Substances 0.167** 0.00905 0.0318
(0.0761) (0.0440) (0.0419)
Petroleum 0.0165 -0.0551** -0.0103
(0.0254) (0.0257) (0.0294)
Property size (acres) 0.0353*** 0.00564 0.00293
(0.0118) (0.0052) (0.0064)
% Low income -0.00315 -0.00242 -0.00225
(0.0062) (0.0017) (0.0014)
% Crime -11.10 -6.119 -6.112
(10.9047) (4.5145) (3.7841)
% Proficient or Advanced 0.00361 0.000401 -3.00e-05
(0.0038) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Industrial activity nearby 0.541*** -0.0536 -0.0807
(0.0878) (0.0993) (0.1135)
Residential nearby -0.309*** 0.0126 -0.0230
(0.0482) (0.0237) (0.0284)
School nearby -0.401*** 0.0508* 0.0883***
(0.0330) (0.0251) (0.0286)
Greenspace nearby -0.391*** 0.0173 -2.17e-05
(0.0357) (0.0263) (0.0550)
Constant 27.21 -8.892 -4.594
(27.6907) (22.6718) (15.7899)
Obs. 64,784 64,784 51,620
R-squared 0.416 0.606 0.612
House Characteristics X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Neighborhood Characteristics X X X
District Fixed Effects X X X
Note: Cluster- Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are clustered at the District level. There are 37 37 groups in the restricted sample.
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Table 3.10: IV Regression using Different Aquifer Distances
Distance to Aquifer ≤ B km
VARIABLES B = 5km B = 3km B = 2km B = 1km
exceedthreshold 0.302 0.0810 -0.0471 -0.0448
(0.4468) (0.1610) (0.0622) (0.0849)
maxtox 0 0 -0 -0
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Distance to Brownfield 5.88e-05*** 4.55e-05*** 4.09e-05*** 5.04e-05***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
# Bathrooms 0.111*** 0.101*** 0.0999*** 0.0917***
(0.0127) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0123)
# Bedrooms -0.00142 0.000865 0.000202 -0.000838
(0.0070) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0066)
Sq. Ft. 0.000111*** 0.000107*** 0.000102*** 0.000108***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Year built 0.0164* 0.0125* 0.0103 0.00949
(0.0088) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0077)
Age 0.0148 0.0104 0.00811 0.00751
(0.0090) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0078)
Single family 0.0990*** 0.0831** 0.0799** 0.0687*
(0.0327) (0.0317) (0.0357) (0.0389)
Condominium -0.204*** -0.256*** -0.270*** -0.283***
(0.0614) (0.0511) (0.0566) (0.0639)
Awarded 0.0399 0.0901*** 0.0882*** 0.0691*
(0.0872) (0.0288) (0.0260) (0.0408)
Proposal Score (std.) 0.00351 0.00338 0.00127 0.00140
(0.0054) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0026)
Hazardous Substances -0.107 -0.0805 -0.0543 -0.0905
(0.1213) (0.0829) (0.0568) (0.0588)
Petroleum -0.0994** -0.117*** -0.112*** -0.130***
(0.0416) (0.0342) (0.0277) (0.0373)
Property size (acres) 0.0323 0.0225 0.0106* 0.0106
(0.0325) (0.0140) (0.0056) (0.0102)
% Low income -0.000714 -0.000881 -0.000854 -0.00110
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0026)
% Crime -0.139 -1.904 -3.065 -2.584
(5.8973) (4.6599) (4.8297) (5.1672)
% Proficient or Advanced -0.00435 -0.00237* -0.00168* -0.00129
(0.0034) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Industrial activity nearby -0.165 -0.00982 -0.0417*** -0.0358
(0.1316) (0.0299) (0.0149) (0.1021)
Residential nearby 0.0512 0.121** 0.0895** 0.0754*
(0.0628) (0.0598) (0.0421) (0.0424)
School nearby 0.252 0.0829 0.0234 0.0350
(0.2738) (0.0857) (0.0372) (0.0429)
Greenspace nearby -0.0746 0.0457 0.0265 0.0381
(0.1053) (0.0799) (0.0427) (0.0738)
Constant -21.94 -13.96 -9.817 -7.466
(18.1418) (13.0196) (14.4399) (15.3910)
Obs. 128,584 116,431 106,149 85,174
R-squared 0.616 0.635 0.621 0.612
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Brownfields in Massachusetts
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Figure 3.2: Aquifers in Massachusetts
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